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The type of engagement necessary for US security is not compatible with the 
interests of today's US SOF. America requires a Global Engagement Plan (GEP) that is 
unprecedented in its patience and persistence, and that maintains a diffuse presence 
everywhere on the planet. Such a plan envisions and necessitates deliberate, intimate, and 
continuous American contact with sizeable segments of the world’s population -- the 
predominantly non-elite majority that is inadequately observed and reported on by extant 
instruments of American power. Operatives tasked with executing the GEP would be 
permanently immersed in the host environment, taking a U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) 
mantra to “operate by, with, and through indigenous forces and peoples” to an extreme. 
Current American governmental structures and methods of foreign engagement are 
unequal to such a task. America already has a force whose mission includes acting as 
"global scouts": SF. Nevertheless, the traditional method of SF employment is inadequate 
to providing such deliberate, intimate, and continuous observation and reporting. A better 
method of global engagement can be found in both a Regional Engagement Concept 
(REC) for (military) soldiers, and a proposed Global Engagement Agency within the 
Department of State for (civilian) operatives. Retired and/or transitioned SF soldiers 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
To meet the challenges of the twenty-first century – a century which promises 
continuing friction between the forces of modern globalization and traditional patterns of 
human order – America will need to make use of every available mode of engagement. It 
is therefore useful and necessary to periodically review the way in which America 
engages the world. This thesis argues that American security and national interests would 
be well-served by engaging the world in a deliberately diffused manner. A proposed 
Global Engagement Plan (GEP) would permanently place American civilian operatives in 
every micro-region of the world to observe and report information in human 
environments that are under-observed, and whose activities are under-reported. Such 
operatives would: (1) establish a permanent and continuous American presence at a 
foreign local level; (2) provide an additional means to observe and report ground truth of 
such foreign environments on an unprecedented scale; (3) provide open source human 
information on foreign populations and environments useful to verification of local 
conditions, foreign government behavior toward their population, and American 
Government agencies' and non-governmental organizations' (NGO) activities and 
effectiveness abroad; (4) present continuous and locally-derived foreign information 
useful to the coordination of all the instruments of American national power during 
specific events and operations ; (5) provide continuous information capture and reporting 
for the ongoing development of national databases and policy formation beyond specific 
events and operations ; (6) serve, where appropriate, as liaisons between foreign local 
micro-environments and other manifestations of American engagement policy; (7) 
provide, when appropriate, in-place pilot teams and bases of operation for all other 
instruments of national power; and (8) provide, where appropriate, operative agents of 
American foreign policy in pursuing the stated American interests of spreading liberty, 
the rule of law, human rights, and free and fair trade.  
Any such operative would require multiple skills. The traditional and 
conventional diplomat, soldier, spy, policeman, aid worker, missionary, journalist, 
economic surveyor, or salesman would each possess some of the skills required of such 
an operative, but usually not all of them at once and in the same person. Such operatives 
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would require all of these skills. The indispensability of each skill should not however 
suggest that they are of equal importance. The diplomat and soldier skills predominate. 
Many parts of the world remain dangerous and even lawless. In many places, academic 
notions about the just exercise of power remain an unrealized or imperfectly implemented 
dream. Such places continue to be ruled by naked and open force, by force just under the 
surface of civil society, and/or force masquerading as something else. Such operatives 
would have to be accustomed to perceiving the many manifestations of force. They 
would have to be resourceful in their own defense -- especially in their role as a minority 
and guest of a foreign society. “Defense” would have to be based on using what was 
available in the host society and environment itself, not the guaranteed promise of 
overwhelming and intrusive American firepower. Many parts of the world lack basic 
facilities and comforts that would meet the most basic minimum standard of typical 
American life. Therefore, such operatives would have to be physically tough and 
uncommonly tenacious in the face of physical hardship. They would have to be 
accustomed to surviving and operating in environments devoid of the modern pleasures 
of the most-developed world. They would have to be uncommonly resilient and 
resourceful to remain (sometimes discretely) in-place, to survive, and to continuously 
function as observers and reporters.1 And they would require individual brilliance in 
dealing with foreign peoples.2 Their quest would be to transition from strange minority 
outsider to an accepted minority guest and acceptable local representative of America’s 
permanent engagement. America already has such operators extant in the United States 
Army Special Forces (SF) if America only had the vision and political will to use them in 
                                                 
1 Jones, R.V. (1965). Chance observation and the alert mind. In B. Whaley (Ed.), An Intelligence 
Reader (2nd ed.,). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. pp. 633-644. Jones’ discussion of scientific 
advance is deliberately and directly parallel to useful truths in intelligence work. “Chance favors the trained 
observer, so that the skilled, alert observer is able to take advantage of  the accident of experiment, which 
may show him something quite different from, or well beyond, what he is looking for…. It may indicate 
that past thought has been on the wrong track (p. 637) “No matter how humble the field of science in which 
one is working, the same truth holds – the alert observer always has a special contribution to make. It need 
not necessarily be in pure science. It can be in technology, in everyday life, in the detection of crime, or 
even in war (p. 642).” 
2 Simons, A. & Tucker, D. (2004). Improving Human Intelligence In The War On Terrorism: The 
Need For An Ethnographic Capability. Paper as yet not publicly released, submitted to the Office of Net 
Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. Simons & 
Tucker’s paper identifies many of the same problems discussed in this thesis. They provide examples of the 
kind of intellect, temperament, and dedicated employment required of those who could effectively serve as 
the observers envisioned by this thesis. The examples include anthropologists, Imperial British Army 
officers, and a trio of renowned women travelers. 
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such a role. Unfortunately, the military has not chosen to use SF in such a sustained 
manner. Given the relatively short-term and instrumental focus of the military, it may be 
more prudent to expand the Department of State (DOS) by creating a subordinate Global 
Engagement Agency (GEA) with a charter to engage the areas outside of traditional 
foreign policy coverage. This thesis argues that the implementation of a Regional 
Engagement Concept (REC) could improve military engagement, while retired and/or 
transitioned SF soldiers could form the nucleus of a GEA.  
 
A. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis argues that America should develop a Global Engagement Plan (GEP) 
that is unprecedented in its patience and persistence, and that maintains a diffuse presence 
everywhere on the planet. Such a plan envisions and necessitates deliberate, intimate, and 
continuous American contact with the (predominantly non-elite) majority of the world’s 
population. Because the operatives tasked with executing the plan would be permanently 
immersed in the host environment, such contact would take an SF mantra to “operate by, 
with, and through indigenous forces and peoples” to an extreme. The thesis begins by 
discussing why current American governmental structures and methods of foreign 
engagement are unequal to the task (Chapter II). 
America already has a force whose mission includes acting as "global scouts": SF. 
Nevertheless, the traditional method of SF employment is inadequate to providing such 
deliberate, intimate, and continuous observation and reporting. In Chapter III, this thesis 
will review and critique a method by which SF soldiers can be better employed to 
conduct Regional Engagement in a military context. It will then proceed to propose a 
vastly expanded version -- the GEP -- which augments traditional observation and 
reporting activities through a new civilian agency subordinate to the DOS. Chapter IV 
will summarize the thesis and its conclusions. 
 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM 
America is currently the world’s strongest military and economic power, with 
global reach and resources so great, that when an issue of interest is clearly identified and 
the political will to address it is wielded, America can bring shattering power to bear. 
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Nevertheless, there are real limits to the reach of American power and influence, based 
on – among other things - a lack of information on, and a lack of consistent engagement 
in, the wider world. America continues to engage the world officially and primarily as a 
national state in a familiar system of states in an otherwise anarchic world system. As 
numerous commentators have noted, however, the state appears to be in a period of 
relative decline, and the 21st century will see increasing engagement with non-state, non-
traditional actors of an asymmetric proportion. 3 
Current American government structures and methods of engagement with the 
world rely on state-to-state reporting of conditions. Other states' subject populations are 
predominantly engaged only indirectly. Regardless of the quality or level of probity in 
such foreign regimes, America continues to rely predominantly on traditional regime-to-
regime relations and reporting of host nation conditions. This may allow the true 
conditions of foreign mass populations to remain underappreciated, or even to remain 
hostage to the whims of foreign regime representation. In many cases, direct American 
engagement with such populations could improve American understanding of ground 
truth in foreign environments, leading to the formulation of better American policy. In 
some instances, such expanded and more direct engagement with, observation of, and 
reporting on, the majority of the world's population could forestall and preempt the 
majority of the non-state, non-traditional, and asymmetric challenges that are an 
apparently increasing phenomenon.  
America therefore requires a new and deliberate method for such engagement: 
the GEP. Such a method would demand paying more deliberate attention to the non-elite 
communities of foreign states. This represents a different emphasis from the necessary 
and traditional methods of American foreign engagement focused on regime-to-regime 
intercourse. Such a plan requires personnel with the requisite temperament, traits, and 
skills (TTS) to immerse themselves -- so far as is possible and consistent with American 
policy -- into often harsh and sometimes dangerous human micro-environments. Such 
"GEP operatives" (GEOs) would need to rely on the kind of cultural interoperability 
skills, physical and mental toughness, and routine familiarity with harsh, often poor, and 
                                                 
3 O’Meara, P., Mehlinger, H., & Krain, M. (Eds.). (2000). Globalization And The Challenges Of A 
New Century: A Reader. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
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sometimes dangerous foreign environments, that are a hallmark of Army Special Forces 
soldiers. Therefore, rather than simply expanding the number of DOS Foreign Service 
Officers (FSOs), or other U.S. Government (USG) personnel traditionally assigned to 
American embassies abroad, a new agency with a new kind of operative is recommended. 
 
C. METHODS 
Hypothesis: This thesis' hypothesis is that traditional methods of USG 
engagement with foreign populations, while necessary, are nevertheless insufficient to 
observe and report on the majority of the world's population in a persistent, consistent, 
and long-term manner. If threats to America are believed to increasingly arise from such 
(predominantly non-elite) masses, it would be prudent to develop an ability to conduct 
such observation and reporting. Army SF has the charter to act as global scouts among 
their array of missions. The military, however, is most often focused on more short-term 
instrumentality in its use of SF. To reap more persistent, consistent, and long-term 
observation and reporting, the military could use a REC that focuses on a more consistent 
presence. Given that military efforts follow (understandably) military rationales for 
employment, and such efforts are sometimes limited by their very military nature, it 
seems reasonable to make GEOs civilian operatives. Civilian operatives -- as part of the 
DOS mission -- would be more acceptable to many more foreign host nations than would 
the presence of American military personnel. Nevertheless, simply increasing the number 
of traditional FSOs is not an adequate solution. Permanent/near-permanent presence in 
such environments requires operatives to have the TTS common to SF soldiers. It is 
therefore recommended that such civilian DOS officials -- GEOs -- be drawn from 
retired/transitioned SF personnel. 
Research Questions: In conducting this analysis I will address the following 
questions: 
1. Are the traditional instruments of American power sufficient for persistent, 
consistent, and long-term engagement with foreign human micro environments -- an 
engagement that results in continuous observation and reporting of mass human 
communities outside of the traditional corridors of power? 
2. How can military observation and reporting be improved?  
6 
3. How might a civilian method of observation and reporting be conceived?  
4. What new structure might be recommended to achieve this civilian method of 
observation and reporting? 
 
D. SUBSEQUENT CHAPTER SYNOPSES 
1. Background and Scope of the Problem (Chapter II). 
Despite its unprecedented achievements, power, and potential, America has often 
blundered badly in its foreign engagements due to an insufficient understanding of the 
environments in which it sought and strove to engage. America’s traditional instruments 
of national power are inadequate to the observation and reporting of all information that 
would enhance American national interests and security, help prevent such blunders, and 
provide a proactive conduit for better understanding -- and thereby better influencing -- 
foreign affairs. The instruments of national power include diplomatic, economic, 
financial, informational, intelligence, law-enforcement, and military.4 It can be argued 
that America already possesses everything required to observe and report information in 
any region of the globe, that a new concept is unnecessary, and the effort and expense to 
realize any such new effort is unwarranted. This argument is incorrect. A new effort is 
required to fill the gaps in American understanding of the global environment. The thesis  
will examine each American instrument of national power in turn, and show why they are 
unequal to the task of comprehensive global engagement. 
 
2. Models of Engagement: Improving U.S. Army Special Forces 
Engagement in a Possible Practical Future (the Regional Engagement 
Concept), and a Grand (Civilian) Conception for the Future (the 
Global Engagement Plan). (Chapter III) 
Assuming one admits a need for a more comprehensive manner of conducting 
engagement activities beyond the historical pattern, one must then ask what model of 
employment is necessary. Chapter III revisits, analyzes, and critiques one such practical 
method for expanded military engagement; the Regional Engagement Concept Model 
                                                 
4 U.S.Government (2003, February).  National Strategy For Combating Terrorism. Washington DC: 
US Government Printing Office. , p. 1. 
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(REC).5 Based on the review and critique of the REC, a solution for enhancing the 
observation and reporting inherent in expanded engagement is proposed in a broader and 
more comprehensive civilian Global Engagement Plan (GEP). 
 
3. Thesis Summary (Chapter IV)



















                                                 
5 Rothstein, H. (1999). Regional Engagement: An Army Special Operations Forces Approach To 
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II. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
At the beginning of the 21st century, America finds itself primus inter pares, the 
lone “Superpower,” in a world of actors that concurrently admire it, loathe it, and always 
contend with it in their own continuing (and often adversarial) interests. Despite its 
unprecedented achievements, power, and potential, America has often blundered badly in 
its foreign engagements due to an insufficient understanding of the environments in 
which it sought and strove to engage. America’s traditional instruments of national power 
are inadequate to the observation and reporting of all information that would enhance 
American national interests and security, help prevent such blunders, and provide a 
proactive conduit for better understanding -- and thereby better influencing -- of foreign 
affairs. Since 9/11 and the advent of the GWOT, America has been re-examining the 
purpose, structure, and employment of these instruments in the attempt to better prepare 
itself for the challenges and responsibilities of the new century. Nevertheless, nothing 
like a GEP as proposed here has yet been asserted.  
The instruments of national power include diplomatic, economic, financial, 
informational, intelligence, law-enforcement, and military. 6 It can be argued that America 
already possesses everything required to observe and report information in any region of 
the globe, that a new concept is unnecessary, and the effort and expense to realize any 
such new effort is unwarranted. This argument is incorrect. A new effort is required to fill 
the gaps in American understanding of the global environment. Chapter II will examine 
each American instrument of national power in turn, and show why they are unequal to 
the task of comprehensive global engagement. 
 
A. DIPLOMATIC 
The Department of State (DOS) is America’s lead agency in dealing with foreign 
governments and international issues. DOS currently operates 197 embassies and 
consulates in 159 foreign countries worldwide.7 These embassies are the primary US 
                                                 
6 U.S.Government (2003, February). National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, p. 1. 
7 U.S. Department of State (2005, February 26). Retrieved 26 February 2005 from 
http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/embassies/embassies_1214.html 
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government interface with foreign governments, and the primary source of reporting on 
conditions in foreign lands. Because embassies are the conduit for international 
government to government intercourse, all embassies are located in the capitol cities of 
foreign countries where they have access to the top governmental leaders of each foreign 
nation. National power, wealth, leading industries, and leading educational institutions 
are typically concentrated in the capitol city. They profit from the close contact with key 
governmental decision makers; the highest development of economic conditions in the 
country; the concentration of wealth and financial power; access to the most highly 
developed communications; and the concentration of most leaders (“prime movers”) of 
all fields of endeavor in most countries. The headquarters of foreign military, 
intelligence, and law enforcement will also typically be located in foreign capitol cities. 
Because the official national power of foreign countries is condensed in their capitol 
cities, the DOS and other agencies resident in American embassies abroad are well-
placed to engage, observe, and report on the activities of foreign prime movers and 
official foreign government policies. In many foreign countries, American consulates are 
placed in outlying major cities and/or geographically important areas to expand this 
interface with the foreign state. One would err, however, in assuming that everything 
America needed to know about the conditions in a foreign country can be provided by 
and through America’s foreign missions abroad as currently staffed and chartered. 
American embassies’ advantage in being co-located with the centers of foreign 
power is concurrently a limiting disadvantage. It is necessary and appropriate that the 
American President’s Ambassador to any given country represent the current President’s 
position to the supreme official authority in the foreign government (and receive the 
current position of that current foreign government for relay back to the President). But 
official regimes and supreme authorities come and go both here and in foreign capitols. 
Such intercourse as occurs between foreign governmental prime movers and the 
American Ambassador is inescapably focused on the nuanced calculus of power among 
key individuals. Although such government-to-government intercourse and 
representation is indispensable, one must not assume that the entire intercourse amongst 
nations can be represented by such discrete and rational interchange. As Migdal has 
explained in Strong Societies and Weak States, it has been a common mistake to assume 
11 
that the state apparatus is more powerful and informed than it really is.8 Moreover, 
Allison & Zelikow have shown in Essence of Decision that even where a strong, 
developed government exists, it does not operate as a monolith in lock-step pursuit of a 
single, rational, and unifying goal. 9 The “state” and the government that controls it are 
merely two actors in a larger national story. The holistic reality of any national state is 
much more than the state apparatus and the regime in power.10 
To appreciate the larger national trends coalescing from more specific 
occurrences, the President (or Ambassador) relies on subordinate officials and experts to 
gather, collate, analyze, and report. In the American system however, the President has 
incomparable advantages in such reporting and analysis compared to any American 
Ambassador in a foreign country because official American observers can go almost 
anywhere to observe and report on local conditions. The President enjoys a stable and 
highly developed governmental structure, with conduits of information from senators and 
governors, congressman, mayors, county commissioners, and local sheriffs and school 
boards. The smaller the jurisdiction of each information-reporting echelon and the more 
intimate the reporter is with the holistic conditions of the local level environment, the 
more specific the "ground truth" of such information can become. In addition, the 
American government has a built- in system of accountability (representative government 
limited by the affirmation or condemnation through popular franchise), which is back-
stopped by a free and aggressive press. No one doubts that if troublesome local 
conditions become a matter for national government concern that such issues will 
percolate up to the attention of those who can fix their attention on them. The national 
government, so alerted, has the resources to focus national attention and resources 
directly and expeditiously on any local problem. Local problems may go unobserved, of 
course, until tragedy strikes, local grievances expand into broad-based movements or 
                                                 
8 Migdal, J. (1988). Strong Societies And Weak States: State-Society Relations And State Capabilities 
In The Third World., Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 10-41. 
9 Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence Of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis. New 
York: Longman. pp. 255-283. 
10 If one should challenge this, just imagine what degree of daily resolution the current American 
President will have on the effect illegal immigration is having on street crime in Los Angeles, how weather 
anomalies and market disruption from declining shrimp populations could lead to increased unemployment 
amongst Vietnamese fis herman on the Louisiana coast, or how white, rural populations can be radicalized 
by media in the counties surrounding Boise, Roanoke, or Peoria. 
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significant damage is caused that could (in hindsight) have been avoided. Moreover, the 
national government may not have the requisite personnel, equipment, or procedures 
immediately at hand to address a local problem. Nevertheless, the ability of the US 
government to observe, orient, decide, and act (the so-called “OODA” loop)11 on a 
problem of governance is beyond dispute.  
Consider, by contrast, the ability of both foreign governments to respond to local 
foreign problems, and the American Ambassador’s ability to respond to the management 
of American interests in the foreign government’s response.  In most highly-developed 
countries, the adequacy of foreign governments to respond to local crisis, the availability 
of a free and aggressive press, and the speed and sophistication of communications rivals 
that of the United States.  In environments such as Japan, Great Britain, or Israel, for 
example, the foreign government is not only responsive to its own citizens, the 
information available to the American embassy will be nearly the same in quality and 
timeliness as that available to the host nation government. In most of these same 
countries, the embassy will be provided with sufficient detailed information upon query 
or in many cases, even unsolicited. Often the embassy will view breaking news occurring 
in a developed host nation on CNN in real time, and often at the same time as the host 
nation government. Every country, including America's closest allies will have secrets of 
course, but the open-source information about the structure, events in, and trends of 
foreign societies upon which foreign national forecasts are made by the American 
embassy are relatively easy to access and assess.  
In many other environments, however, the host foreign government itself has only 
an imperfect and time- lagged understanding of its own citizenry and national 
environment. Nowhere is the “state” omnipresent and omniscient; not in America, not in 
tiny city-states like Singapore, and not in authoritarian states like Iran and China. Even in 
extreme cases of state control like North Korea or the former Soviet Union, the state is 
limited in its perceptions and in the timeliness of its responses. For example, the number 
and flow of North Korean refugees into China and the indigenous mechanism of their 
evasion into Liaoning, or the latest developments among a restive Buryat minority, may 
be as opaque to Pyongyang or the Kremlin as they are to the American Embassy.  
                                                 
11 Richards, C. (2001, Fall). A Swift Elusive Sword: What If Sun Tzu And John Boyd Did A National 
Defense Review? Paper presented at the Fall 2001 Boyd Conference. MCB Quantico, VA. 
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Suppose there is a development of interest in a relatively undeveloped province in 
a generally friendly and cooperative foreign nation such as the Philippines, Kenya, or 
Columbia. Assume that the province is far distant from the foreign capitol and the 
American embassy and even the indigenous population regards the far- flung province, its 
state-of-development, and its population as “backwards.” Basic developments such as 
clean, running water systems and sewerage, and 24-hour ava ilability of electricity are 
sparse or absent. Education, if any, is meager, basic, and dominated by traditional 
conservative social elders. There may be few if any computers or even telephones, except 
perhaps in the provincial capitol. Amenities are few, the standard of living is low, and 
entertainments and diversions are traditional and unsophisticated. Residence or duty in 
such a place is not seen as desirable by the nation’s elite or middle classes. If the senior 
resident officials responsive to the national capitol come from outside the province, it is 
likely that they are posted there unwillingly and without much enthusiasm for their 
duties. How does the American embassy monitor what developments are occurring in the 
far-flung province? 
The host foreign nation itself is constrained in gathering timely information on the 
province due to the poor communications available between the national and provincial 
capitols. Host nation neglect has left the province devoid of either reliable infrastructure 
or a populace accustomed to regarding the capitol as its benefactor. Even well-meaning 
national officials in the province may suffer from a bunker mentality in the midst of a 
hostile population. Should officials seek to perform their duties conscientiously, they may 
still be limited by the dearth of infrastructure (roads, fuel, etc) from routinely monitoring 
what occurs in the province’s outer reaches. In a routine of spotty reporting even within 
host nation channels, how much information will be provided by the host nation 
government to the American embassy?  
Now assume that (for whatever reason) the local provincial populace is hostile to 
American interests. Assuming the American embassy is not tipped off by a happy 
coincidence, such as a report from a trusted indigenous friend recently returned from the 
province, how is the embassy to know the state of affairs? In at least some instances, the 
host nation government will be reticent to admit that hostile and anti-American forces 
constitute a part of their populace, and much more reticent to admit they cannot afford to 
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do much or anything about it. Direct American monitoring of the province environment 
may be made more difficult by travel restrictions put in place by the host nation 
government. These restrictions may be for the protection of their American guests, to 
cover up heavy-handed host nation repressive activities, or even due primarily to 
embarrassment at their indigenous government’s limits of control. Regardless of the 
rationale or reasonableness of the restrictions, such restrictions make it difficult to 
impossible for Americans to monitor the situation first hand. Pressed for information 
and/or travel clearance by the American embassy, the host nation is often likely to evade, 
stall or outright deny access and cooperation.  In some foreign nations, access to remote 
areas is simply not permitted.  
In a majority of foreign nations, however, the difficulties of observing and 
reporting in remote or traditionally under-reported areas are self- imposed by America 
itself. There are understandable limitations on scarce resources and personnel, and the use 
of such resources must be prioritized to only the most pressing concerns. If the host 
nation government is unwilling and/or unable to provide timely and accurate information 
on areas of its own country, the American embassy will either dispatch its own personnel 
to investigate the issue at hand, or will indirectly rely on indigenous personnel to gather 
the information (or both). Such reliance on indigenous personnel involves a host of risks, 
complications and distortions that impedes timeliness and veracity, and introduces a 
requirement of translation from the local indigenous perspective to the national capitol 
perspective of the American mission. One does not argue that the necessary effort and 
expenditure to develop such networks of trusted indigenous operatives is not essential. 
Such rapport building with friendly and/or willing indigenous “co-operatives” is 
indispensable to building and maintaining friendly bilateral relations, enhancing good-
will toward American interests, and in information gathering. The constraints facing the 
embassy, however, whether by active effort of the host government, or the passive costs 
and constraints of developing indigenous co-operatives, limit the timeliness and veracity 
of information obtained. Moreover, even if American embassy officials or indigenous co-
operatives make the journey to investigate, they are likely to remain in the distant 
province only long enough to see the current development-of- interest through; after 
which, the officials and co-operatives will return to the capitol. This means that 
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observation of the local area spikes during an action-reaction cycle spin-up, and 
dissipates when the development passes and the cyc le once again spins down. 
Observation and reporting (and therefore intimate understanding) are not continuous.  
The examples above already assume that the American embassy is aware of the 
development in the first place, and is not blind-sided by developments after they have 
grown beyond relatively easy local containment. It makes no great difference how fast 
one's OODA loop is if you never observe the development of interest to begin with. 
These “unknown unknowns”12 may contain significant import and danger, and America 
leaves itself unnecessarily vulnerable to asymmetric threats if it neglects to observe the 
environments in which they breed. Most current embassy staffs are not sufficiently 
manned to permit the permanent deployment of their finite diplomatic staffs for 
continuous monitoring of local indigenous ground truth. Most American Foreign Service 
Officers (FSO) would frankly prefer service in the major urban centers of the foreign 
countries to which they are posted rather than a career in which they are predominantly 
“banished” to the host nation’s worst backwaters; much less the worst backwaters of the 
world’s worst backwater nations. Moreover, the traditional role of American embassies in 
conducting state-to-state interactions remains essential. It is clear that FSO's urbane and 
generalist mission profile should remain basically unchanged. Since America doesn't 
train its FSO’s to be rugged global scouts, however - living continuously amongst the 
wretched of the earth - it is equally clear that the current FSO’s as traditionally mandated, 
trained, and employed (or even ten times their current number) are not the solution to 
continuous observation and reporting of the world’s remotest and meanest environments.  
America’s embassies also include many non-DOS personnel on their staffs, of 
course. The Department of Defense (DOD), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and many other agencies inhabit America’s 
foreign missions and contribute to the unified efforts of each country team. In most cases, 
however, these agencies are constrained by the same difficulties and obstacles pertaining 
                                                 
12 Rumsfeld, D. (2002, June 6). Press Conference at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium. 
Retrieved February 25, 2005 from http://www.usembassy.it/file2002_06/alia/a2060711.htm “The message 
is that there are no ‘knowns.’ There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is 
to say there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are 
things we don't know we don't know. So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information 
together, and we then say well that's basically what we see as the situation, that is really only the known 
knowns and the known unknowns. And each year, we discover a few more of those unknown unknowns.” 
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to the larger embassy staff and the DOS professionals. They typically follow the same 
cycle of action-reaction spin-up/spin-down as the DOS. They tend to be discrete-mission 
oriented, seek to do most of their in-country activities through their host-nation 
professional counterparts, and, like their FSO colleagues are constrained in their 
effectiveness by not being out in the outlying provinces on a continuous basis. Even such 
intelligence professionals as may inhabit an American mission will conduct their work 
primarily in an indirect manner (through indigenous professional counterparts and co-
operatives) and predominantly from the safe distance of the capitol. Moreover, the 
primary function of America’s national intelligence is the intercourse with, and appraisal 
of, foreign states. As a matter of simple efficiency, it is understandable that the nation’s 
intelligence services devote their finite resources and professional staff primarily to 
matters of state-to-state appraisal, and predominantly to currently “hot” issues.     
Nor do military personnel resident abroad typically perform the function of 
continuously observing and reporting on outlying foreign environments. Military 
members of the embassy country team work primarily for the Ambassador. A Defense 
Attaché (DATT) functions as the Theater Commander's and Ambassador’s senior 
representative and liaison to the host nation military. This means that his or her 
intercourse with the host nation follows the same pattern as most other functional 
agencies in the embassy; it will be focused on the elite prime movers in the host nation 
government and the monitoring of foreign state policies and activities from the official 
and national level. A defense attaché’s information on all security-related information in 
the host nation will be constrained by the same frictions and limitations as other embassy 
agencies; sometimes more so as host nation security concerns may make host nation 
observation and reporting more opaque rather than less. The attaché is generally a senior 
military officer, and always obliged to be the military face of the embassy’s diplomatic 
representation; he or she is a diplomat in uniform. While some individual DATTs do 
travel widely enough to observe and report on remote local conditions, their limited 
numbers and priority focus on elites does not typically provide such reporting in 
sufficient detail or with sufficient consistency. All of these characteristics make DATTs 
generally unsuited to continuous presence in outlying foreign environments and away 
from the host nation’s seat of state power. Moreover, DATTs can only be in one place at 
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one time. Depending on the size, power, and importance of the host nation, the embassy’s 
DATT may be the sole American military representative on the country team. 
Most embassies will have a more robust military presence in a Defense Attaché 
Office (DAO). DAOs may consist of one DATT with a single administrative assistant for 
small countries, or they may comprise major sections of embassies in the most powerful, 
important, and/or most closely allied nations. A single DAO may contain numerous 
DATTs from different services, several additional military Foreign Area Officers 
(FAOs), staff officers with specialized skills such as communications or procurement, 
and a host of administrative, operational, and support personnel. With the exception of 
the FAOs, virtually all of the activities of the military personnel are constrained by the 
limitations mentioned previously. Moreover, the majority of DAO personnel are focused 
on the embassy’s diplomatic requirements and the operational support of the embassy and 
its mission, not in continuous reporting of environmental observations. DATTs liaise 
through, report on, and coordinate military-to-military efforts, communicators 
communicate, procurers procure, and the military administrative, operational, and other 
support staff personnel primarily support the requirements of the embassy and the DAO 
itself. Beyond reporting on the host nation's military, most DAO personnel find too much 
of their time and focus absorbed by “operations” involving the comings and goings of 
military visitors, VIPs, and/or the support of temporary duty (TDY) military units and 
officials (where bilateral agreements with the host nation allow them). To expect that the 
military staffs of the DAO have the time, staff, resources, or mandate to maintain 
continuous observation in and reporting of regions remote from the capitol and embassy 
would be to assume in error. Nor would an augmented or reoriented DAO staff fill the 
gap in engagement and reporting if they do not fundamentally change their job 
descriptions/requirements to continuous presence and  engagement with outlying foreign 
environments. 
FAOs are military officers from basic branches who have a secondary career 
specialization that requires expertise in a particular country or region. FAOs receive good 
quality schooling in their assigned count ry’s/region’s history, culture, and structure. They 
usually receive good quality and pertinent language training prior to being assigned to an 
overseas posting in the embassy or Military Group (MILGROUP). Working out of the 
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DAO, FAOs often get the opportunity to travel widely in the host nation country during 
their tour. This facilitates the sharpening of their expertise, and does provide the embassy 
an asset to reconnoiter areas and situations of interest.  
Several limitations, however, prevent the FAOs from providing continuous and 
intimate observation and reporting in foreign micro-environments. Although some FAOs 
are fortunate enough to remain in their assigned countries or regions for many years, 
many other FAOs’ tours are generally short (2-3 years). Once their treasured in-country 
experience is completed, some will never return to the country in which they are 
“expert.” Although a hand-off of information occurs between FAOs transitioning out of 
and into the embassies, information transfer is limited by time and to that which can be 
imparted in verbal, visual, and written discourse. The intimate and visceral experience of 
backcountry conditions largely leaves with the out-going FAO. The career development 
and progression of FAOs sometimes works to the advantage of maintaining country-
specific and regional expertise; officers with FAO experience often progress to positions 
on Theater, Department of Defense (DOD) or Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) staffs 
for example. Sometimes the currency of the FAOs' expertise is largely lost, however, as 
they move to positions where their specific expertise goes unused and therefore atrophies. 
Even to the extent that the FAO career pipeline functions as intended and maintains the 
right officers in relevant jobs of increasing seniority, the FAO system is too often focused 
primarily on maintaining a pipeline of officers for a system of adequate coverage, rather 
than focused on the continuity and quality of the American engagement (and the 
information thereby obtained) itself. The incoming FAO will have to “engage” and learn 
many of the same lessons from scratch. Sometimes the knowledge gained from the 
FAO’s experiences may become quite developed if the country is very small and 
conditions permit easy and constant travel. In the biggest and most complex - and often 
most important - countries like Russia, China, India, Brazil, or South Africa, however, 
opportunities to experience even a small portion of the host nation may come from 
“world wind tours” that provide useful general surface impressions, but hardly suffice to 
provide detailed, continuous observation and understanding. Moreover, the justifications 
for these excursions outside of the capitol are not only constrained by host nation 
approval, they are also usually tied to a current project of interest to the ambassador or 
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DATT. Like the cycle of interest in currently hot topics (as mentioned above), the FAO’s 
primary operative focus will be on addressing the questions of a discrete and limited 
problem, not the monitoring of holistic conditions. Such hot topics on which the FAO is 
focused will usually be related to a known issue of interest to the country team. Such 
immediate, issue-based interest will invariably be characterized by time-constrained 
deductive problem-solving, not patient, holistic, and inductive observation. Finally, the 
FAO program is still too embedded in legacy thinking. All FAOs are Regular Line 
Officers (RLO); generalists who are frequently obliged to progress through an ever-
mobile career template enroute to higher responsibility and command. Despite their 
specialization in a particular country or region, too many RLO FAOs will not stay in 
place in a specific, narrowly-defined AO. As FAO qualified officers progress in rank and 
responsibility they will often move to regional or higher billets that cover wider areas of 
responsibility. There are currently no FAO Limited Duty Officers (LDO)/Warrant 
Officers that could provide years of continuous presence in a fixed and limited AO with a 
FAO charter. Virtually all Warrant Officers assigned to attaché duty (Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) 350L) function as DAO operations officers, not as 
country/area specialists. Like many FAOs themselves, diplomatic Warrant Officers move 
frequently. The 350Ls  usually don’t even speak the language of their host nation posting. 
Moreover, despite the superlative capabilities of 350Ls to do their traditional functions on 
DAO staffs, the requirements for continuous global engagement in remote, often hostile, 
areas requires a LDO/WO with a warrior- first ethos (such as 180As or 18-series NCOs); 
just expanding the number of 350Ls will not suffice for the GEP. Some FAOs come from 
the combat arms and some do not. Very few 350Ls are accessed from the combat arms. 
Those FAOs/350Ls who come from the combat arms may reasonably be expected to 
have a warrior ethos suitable for expanded duties in remote environments. The presence 
of such an ethos should not, however, be expected to be universally -- or even generally -
- true. In sum, select FAOs are the nearest manifestation of the diplomat-warrior 
permanently resident in America’s embassies, but they are not intended, nor are they 
sufficient -- even in greater numbers -- to provide continuous, intimate observation and 
reporting of local foreign micro-environments. 
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In addition to the DAO, and its constituent staff permanently resident in a foreign 
country, some foreign missions contain Security Assistance and other advisory functions 
distinct from the DAO. These range from single individuals to expansively staffed and 
outfitted Joint United States Military Advisory Groups (JUSMAG). Security Assistance 
Officers (SAO), whether operating alone or as part of a multi-person office, assist the 
host nation with the transfer of security assistance funds and material provided by the 
United States as a component of bilateral agreements. The senior SAO functions as the 
Theater Commander's point man in-country and is responsible for executing that 
country's portion of the (military) Theater Engagement Plan. This Theater Engagement 
Plan is a military-referenced initiative rather than a program of inductive observation. 
Although SAO are obliged to develop and maintain an expertise in the status and 
requirements of the host nation military, they are focused on the host military as an 
organization and not tasked to maintain detailed and continuous knowledge of remote 
local environments. The SAO will work within the established framework of embassy 
policy regarding U.S.-Host Nation bilateral agreements for assis ting the host nation’s 
security. The SAO is not in country to observe conditions of human micro-environments 
per se, but only to understand them well enough to perceive what assistance the host 
government requires. Practically speaking, SAO are largely focused on equipment 
purchases and transfers, and where they operate without a JUSMAG, in facilitating 
training assistance visits by TDY personnel. Many SAO frequently travel to remote 
regions in the host country and accumulate insight into the host nation’s general security 
concerns. Such travel however is temporary, and SAO are thus unsuited to continuous 
presence and observation of micro-environments. Many important countries with strong 
U.S.-Host Nation bilateral relations and a tradition of close military cooperation have a 
JUSMAG. These organizations exist primarily to coordinate, manage, and support 
American military operations, and other operations with military components, that occur 
continuously (such as U.S. military support to Humanitarian De-mining efforts or the 
retrieval of American remains from past conflicts such as the Joint Task Force Full 
Accounting). JUSMAGs are also preoccupied with support for military exercises that 
include participation by American personnel and occur with regular frequency, such as 
the big Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-directed training exercises and the Joint and Combined 
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Exercises for Training (JCET).  Like SAO, JUSMAG staffs often travel widely 
throughout the host nation country and accumulate considerable insight into the overall 
host nation conditions. Like the SAO, their primary efforts are focused on the operational 
requirements of supporting current and pending operations, not on continuous presence 
in, focus on, and reporting about local foreign conditions in remote regions. Moreover, 
like the embassy and most other official American presence in the host nation, JUSMAG 
personnel are primarily based in the capitol, far away from the remote regions and their 
human environments.  The TDY personnel that JUSMAG supports and occasionally 
accompanies do sometimes go into remote regions, but the JUSMAG presence in those 
remote regions is fleeting. Military TDY operations themselves will be addressed below.  
 
B. ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL 
Some may argue that American economic and financial efforts are already 
coordinated by the embassy, and the embassy already maintains visibility of the myriad 
efforts by (non-U.S. Government) host nation and international assistance organizations 
and aid programs, non-governmental organizations (NGO), volunteer organizations 
(VO), and private companies, etc. This is partially true, but it suffers from the same 
limitations as discussed with the diplomatic instrument. The focus of the embassy 
remains primarily on the host nation foreign government – in this regard host nation 
economic development objectives and efforts and financial inputs – and is thus seen 
primarily through the lens of the host nation government. The same operational 
constraints apply to monitoring of relatively remote and neglected areas’ economic 
development and financial status as all other fields of official American endeavor. 
Although the economic and agricultural sections in some American embassies are quite 
robust and make concerted efforts to assist the host foreign nation, the majority of these 
efforts are pursued through the organization and mechanisms of the host nation. Like 
other fields of embassy endeavor, areas of current economic and financial interest can 
receive massive attention and inputs–to include temporary dispatching of economic and 
financial FSO to remote areas – but such efforts are of limited duration. Once an effort 
has concluded, the American participants withdraw to the embassy or consulate, and rely 
primarily on indirect monitoring of the effort’s effects through host nation government 
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channels and host nation co-operatives. Moreover, while the economic and financial 
trends may be monitored, they are likely to be uncoordinated with the other instruments 
of American power and lack integration into a comprehensive GEP. 
 
C. INFORMATIONAL 
Many commentators since September 11th have argued that America does not 
have, or has not used, sufficient means of engaging the world with “soft power.” This is 
generally understood as waging and winning the “war of ideas” through efforts to inform 
and persuade foreign audiences. Carnes Lord has recently asserted that American soft 
power is “broken,” has outlined what it is and why it is important, and has made 
recommendations on how to fix it. Lord asserts that soft power is “the key to winning the 
GWOT because it is the key to legitimizing U.S. global primacy and highlights America's 
efforts to promote global democracy.”13 After several years of “benign neglect” of soft 
power by the American government, the new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has 
testified before Congress in 2005 that the emphasis on soft power is now a “priority.”14 
Nevertheless, Lord explains that soft power is difficult for several reasons: (1) its 
influence is pervasive, but the exact meaning of what it is, how it is employed, and who 
should do it is elusive; (2) there is both domestic and foreign cultural resistance to it; (3) 
the mission and roles of who does it remains unclear as it cuts across several bureaucratic 
boundaries with no one clearly in charge of a comprehensive policy for formulation and 
action; and there is no clear terminology, doctrine, or trained cadres by which it can be 
conducted.15 Lord decries recent missteps such as the folding of the United States 
Information Agency (USIA) into the DOS, the largely ineffectual Radio Sawa and al 
Hoora efforts, and the abortive Office of Strategic Influence in the DOD. 16 Moreover, 
Lord distinguishes between propaganda, public affairs, and public diplomacy; further 
distinguishing the latter into its constituent parts of information, education and cultural 
                                                 
13 Lord, C. (2005, February 9). American Soft Power: Why It’s Broken And How To Fix It. Lecture 
presented at the Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA. 
14 Lord, C. (2005, February 9). 
15 Lord, C. (2005, February 9). 
16 Lord, C. (2005, February 9). 
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initiatives, and the narrow and specifically targeted “political actions.”17 Finally, Lord 
highlights his assertion that for public diplomacy, the minds of elites are the critical target 
in defeating radical Islam. 18  
This thesis does not challenge Dr. Lord’s outline except in the implications of his 
final emphasis. The remote and relatively underpowered non-elite human communities in 
the micro regions of foreign countries should be considered a legitimate target. Targets of 
DOS public diplomacy can be better engaged with such diplomacy to the extent that the 
American mission better understands the local foreign inhabitants' true concerns. If one 
begins with the assumption that such remote communities are distinct environments 
removed from the elite corridors of official state power, then one would want to monitor 
developments in those distinct environments. It does marginal good to completely 
convince (or even co-opt) the elites of a Reza Pahlevi, a Marcos, or a Batista, if America 
cannot accurately gauge the more humble societies and potentially powerful currents in 
motion underneath and outside of state organs of power. Such remote human 
environments are capable of not only moving separately from official host nation policy, 
they are often able to initiate regime-threatening movements that are unmonitored until it 
is too late to react and intervene -- through host nation regime engagement -- to safeguard 
American interests. Lord, like most U.S. scholars and policy makers, understandably sees 
the efficient application of soft power through “public diplomacy” as legitimately 
structured within the DOS. This is both reasonable and efficient, and consistent with the 
American tradition of DOS ambassadors and embassies being the lead agents and 
agencies in foreign affairs. But if the widespread commentary about the challenges of 
globalization and the gradual erosion of the dominant state-to-state dynamic is correct, 
America requires a more diffused mechanism for observing and reporting the effects of 
such efforts, however they are eventually resolved and implemented. Moreover, the 
availability of such diffuse observers -- where permitted by the host nation -- would 
provide a quick, nearly direct, and honest appraisal of whatever effects such soft power 
                                                 
17 Lord, C. (2005, February 9). 
18 Lord, C. (2005, February 9). 
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influence -- and other manifestations of American Kulturkampf19 -- trickle down and 
through to the foreign micro environment. Such permanent observing and reporting 
would enable the development and fine-tuning of the most relevant and effective 
campaign of public diplomacy in a continuous loop. 
 
D. LAW ENFORCEMENT. 
As has been noted by many commentators, the requirements of prosecuting 
counter- insurgency in Iraq, or similar efforts in other parts of the world in the 21st 
century, share many of the characteristics of efficient law enforcement.20 It is important 
to make the distinction between the important and appropriate use of international and 
national law enforcers such as Interpol and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 
the cooperative effort to track down networks of Al Qaeda or drug cartels, and the more 
pedestrian local toil of the urban beat cop or the county sheriff. The former is a national 
asset using all technologies available to investigate known cases and apprehend identified 
or suspected opponents from the top down. Their efforts are characterized by a mission 
focused on specific individuals and identified threats from the inception, and through 
deliberate police and analytical methods developing an eve r-expanding trail of 
information leading to the apprehension of the subjects of interest. The beat cop or 
sheriff, however, although occasionally tasked to participate in such deliberate efforts, is 
                                                 
19 Libicki, M. (1995). What Is Information Warfare? Institute for National Strategic Studies ACIS 
Paper 3, Ch 6, pp. 4-5. Libicki maintains that cultural conflict is ancient, and downplays the notion that 
culture war is a problem for the United States saying, “cultural warfare is something the United States is 
more likely to do to others.” His position that “political culture… and trade rules aside, policy is completely 
and properly silent about other cultural influences,” suggests that he does not see much utility in the 
cultural (information) warfare promise of public diplomacy.  
20 U.S.Government. (2003, February). National Strategy For Combating Terrorism. The Strategy 
discusses law enforcement as one of the essential instruments of national power. For example, “at every 
opportunity we will continue to enhance international counterterrorism cooperation through the further 
expansion and sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information.” Verton, D. (2003). Black Ice: The 
Invisible Threat Of Cyber-Terrorism. New York: McGraw-Hill. p. 181. Verton quotes former CIA Director 
John Deutch as saying that “new threats like cyber-warfare have blurred the lines between law enforcement 
and national security issues.” Buckley, D. & Meese, M. (2003). The financial front in the global war on 
terrorism. In R. Howard & R. Sawyer (Eds.), R. (2004) Defeating Terrorism: Shaping The New Security 
Strategy. Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill. pp. 51-61. “Judicious enforcement of criminal statutes that are 
typically associated with white-collar and organized crime can be an especially effective tactic against 
terrorists and their financial supporters.” 
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essentially a surveyor and responder to that which is incongruent in their jurisdiction. 21 
The beat cop or sheriff is of the environment in which he works. He becomes intimately 
familiar with both his environment, through continuous presence and long habituation, 
and how the people in his area live and behave. The first warning of growing, broad-
based turmoil which will lead to latent riot conditions in South Central Los Angeles for 
example, is more likely to come from the cop who works there on the streets and in close 
contact with the population, year upon year, than from the mayor, police commissioner, 
or urban criminologists at UCLA. The county sheriff of some remote area in Minnesota 
or Mississippi will likely be the first to spot the new dirt airfield with the suspicious night 
landings of small fixed-wing planes, or the recent influx of illegal aliens looking for work 
and leading to possible racial tensions, than either the local Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) or Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) offices in St. Paul or 
New Orleans. On occasion, the cop or sheriff is mobilized as part of a larger unit to 
conduct a specific and discrete mission or investigation. Most often, however, they are 
observing their jurisdiction for incongruent and unusual events and trends of interest and 
reporting them to higher echelons.   
The same principle is in effect in monitoring developments in remote foreign 
environments for the impact they might have on American global interests. It is 
traditional under the modern understanding of nation-state sovereignty to strictly 
distinguish what are domestic internal affairs and what are foreign affairs. Domestic 
affairs such as the host nation’s law enforcement are the prerogative and responsibility of 
the foreign host nation, the result of the host nation’s historical deve lopment, customs, 
and judicial structure, and are properly handled by the host nation’s internal law 
                                                 
21 Gladwell, M. (2002). The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make A Big Difference. New York: 
Back Bay Books. Discussing epidemics both literally and figuratively as developing social phenomena, 
Gladwell says “epidemics are sensitive to the conditions and circumstances of the times and places in 
which they occur (p. 139).” Gladwell’s discussion of the ‘Broken Windows Theory’ and the ‘Power of 
Context’ provide insight into how observation of seemingly unimportant small matters foreshadow and 
provide insight into larger trends. “the criminal – far from being someone who acts for fundamental, 
intrinsic reasons and who lives in his own world – is actually someone acutely sensitive to his environment, 
who is alert to all kinds of cues, and who is prompted to commit crimes based on his perception of the 
world around him (p. 150).” If American observers can develop this sensitivity – sensitivity only possible 
by continuous presence in the environment – such observers should be able to report developing trends and 
recommend strategies for addressing them. Jones, R.V. (1975). The theory of practical joking: An 
elaboration. In B. Whaley  (Ed.), An Intelligence Reader (2nd ed.). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School. pp. 187-202. Jones discusses the role of spotting incongruities in leaps of scientific insight and 
explicitly points out the parallel with intelligence observation and analysis. 
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enforcement apparatus. One does not argue that America has a responsibility or need to 
follow (or even be aware of) the latest whodunit or he said/she said domestic event. 
Coverage of such a degree is not only impossible and irrelevant, it is absurd. There are, 
however, useful insights to be gained by seeing American global engagement from the 
perspective of the beat cop or sheriff. A local murder or case of arson (or a rapid series of 
such events) in the environs of Manado, on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi, or along 
the Amu Darya river in northern Uzbekistan, is of no particular interest or import to 
American policy makers. If a local American “sheriff,” through continuous presence in, 
and intimate familiarity with, his “jurisdiction” notices that the series of victims happen 
to be the Indonesian Christian community leaders in the area, or Uzbek security 
personnel, however, this information may be indicative of larger and more important 
trends with direct relevance to American interests. Such well-placed and permanent 
American “sheriffs” -- where permitted as augmentees to an established American 
embassy staff -- in remote foreign environments could provide such reports as part of an 
American strategy for global engagement.  
The obvious and immediate objection to this observation would come from the 
DOS and the intelligence communities. They would claim to have direct observation, 
direct reporting, and/or indirect reporting through host nation counterparts. Direct 
observation is extremely unlikely, however, unless it happens to coincide with another 
ongoing effort, or the American mission had previously been alerted to the event. Unless 
it was a lucky coincidence that American operatives were in the area already, America's 
embassies and intelligence agencies simply don’t have the manpower to cover all of these 
remote areas and conduct their other priority missions at the same time. If they had direct 
reporting from an established chain of information-providing host nation co-operatives, 
this raises the difficulties, risks, and expense associated with the maintenance of such a 
chain. Chief amongst these drawbacks are the reliability and timeliness of such reports. 
Moreover, such chains themselves are limited and the efficient use of such co-operatives 
is therefore usually focused on more discrete and specific missions. Nor should it be 
acceptable to assert that once an event or series of events has captured the interest of the 
embassy or intelligence agency that an American observer or host nation co-operative can 
be dispatched on a discrete errand to inquire about conditions. The time lag and 
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necessarily temporary duration of such a dispatch will ensure that the American picture 
of remote, foreign events begins and will likely remain reactive. In fact, the 
overwhelming majority of such law enforcement reports that come to the attention of the 
embassy and intelligence agencies are received indirectly. The American officers are 
informed by their host nation counterparts (after host nation vetting and editing), or the 
information is culled from reports in the host nation press or by indigenous community 
word-of-mouth contacts. Such reports, and the picture pieced together from such 
disjointed sources, may be inaccurate, incomplete, and self-serving, and will certainly be 
time-delayed and inefficiently composed. It would be much preferable to American 
national information gathering to have a direct report from the local American “sheriff” 
who lives in and intimately understands his “jurisdiction.” How many “sheriffs” does 
American currently have in Sulawesi or on the Amu Darya? 
 
E. INTELLIGENCE. 
As of mid-2005, critiques of American intelligence are widespread and everyday 
occurrences. In the years since September 11th 2001, it has become banal to decry 
America’s debilitated Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities and to call for reform. 
Such shortfalls as were identified by Congress’s 9/11 Commission and other 
investigations of intelligence inadequacies have spurred numerous, imaginative 
initiatives. Among these initiatives are: (1) reorganization of America’s intelligence 
structure to a greater or lesser extent; (2) the creation of a national intelligence director 
(which has occurred); (3) DOD attempts at aggregation of more intelligence assets and 
roles from other agencies; (4) more money; (5) expanded authorities; (5) more 
intelligence units; (6) new skills and functions for old units; (7) new units; and (8) new 
concepts such as the Strategic Support Branch (SSB) initiative among others.22 
Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of these initiatives and their operative employment is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, given its conceptual and unclassified nature. As a 
consequence, the discussion below will refer only to open source information. Although 
this thesis remains an unclassified examination, it is possible to generalize the essential  
 
                                                 
22 Gellman, B. (2005, January 23). Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld’s Domain. Washington Post. 
Retrieved May 13, 2005 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/terrorwar/analysis/2005/0123ssb.htm. 
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assumptions of different means for gathering intelligence, each method’s promise and 
particular excellence, and each method’s weaknesses in prosecuting an American global 
engagement plan.  
Before discussing intelligence, however, it is essential to briefly review the 
overarching concepts of this thesis to put its implications into sharp contrast with the 
current American intelligence structure and the promise of new structures and initiatives. 
The envisioned operatives of the proposed American GEP, are not intelligence agents per 
se, are not spies, do not steal other peoples’ secrets, and conduct only the type of open-
source “intelligence” operations consistent with those routinely expected of other DOS 
officials : GEP operatives would be overt (albeit discreet) observers and reporters of open 
source information noticed by well-prepared, mature, and seasoned (ideally military) 
minds. As civilian professionals in an overt role, Title 10, 11, and 50 legal issues would 
be similar to those pertaining to DOS personnel. Where allowed by (explicit or tacit) 
bilateral agreements between the host nation and the American embassy, GEP operatives 
would be allowed the same latitude -- or suffer the same restrictions -- as other DOS 
officials. The reader should remember this contrast between the essential, important, and 
traditional role of espionage and the agencies that conduct it, with the explicitly-
maintained DOS role of GEP operatives.  
America has 15 separate and different intelligence agencies: the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA); the FBI; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Army, 
Naval, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard Intelligence; the National Security 
Agency (NSA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGIA); the Energy Department Office of Intelligence); the State 
Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); the Treasury Department Office 
of Intelligence Support; and the newly-created Homeland Security Department 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Office. These agencies can gather 
information using any one of the traditional functional techniques (HUMINT, ELINT, 
SIGINT, MASINT, IMINT, etc.). Each of these agencies, and the techniques for which 
they have solidified reputations, reached the height of their legacy development during 
World War Two and the Cold War era. Each became defined primarily by their roles in 
preparing for and conducting war against America’s peer nation-state opponents. While 
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peer or near-peer nation-state threats remain the most potentially dangerous to American 
national survival, such major war threats are unlikely. Moreover, the legacy intelligence 
organizations remain equal to the task of preparing for and prosecuting war against major 
potential opponents; that is what they were designed for and are institutionally structured 
to do best. America’s satellites can still look down on known structures such as missile 
silos, mass military formations, installations, visible networks, and cities. They can even 
focus in on tiny spaces if and when they have been given the priority and authority to do 
so. America’s current ability to capture images is enhanced further by a range of air-
breathing platforms from upper altitude SR-71s to ground-hugging pilotless drones. 
America’s ability to capture, collect and analyze signals and emissions in multiple 
formats still leads the world. The military services are expert in their primary air, land, 
and sea dominance roles, and have the ability to collect, analyze and interpret the abilities 
and intentions of their mirrored forces in potentially opposing nation-states. American 
diplomats continue to conduct their traditional role of understanding and interpreting 
foreign nation-state government’s policies and intentions, and the underlying general 
trends of the foreign host nation’s society in which they are posted. Most of these DOD 
and DOS activities have a HUMINT component that contributes to their other methods of 
intelligence gathering, but are likewise limited by resources and the priorities derived 
from their primary organizational objectives. The agency traditionally charged above all 
others with HUMINT has been the CIA. Through direct access to the President, the CIA 
can be charged with undertaking intelligence and covert direct action operations that are 
directly responsive to the President and can be used surgically to fill high- level gaps in 
the intelligence picture or undertake sensitive actions to discretely influence international 
events.23 If properly and consistently placed for observation, GEP operatives could gather 
much useful information that is readily available through open-source observation and 
reporting -- thus freeing the other intelligence agencies for more pressing activities. 
                                                 
23 Zegart, A. (1999). Flawed By Design: The Evolution Of The CIA, JCS, And NSC. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. Zegart has shown how the two main functional components of the CIA, the Directorate of 
Operations (DCO) and the Directorate of Intelligence (DCI) have not evolved evenly. “The [DCO] covert 
wing… arose and flourished because presidents wanted it to…. At the same time, the CIA’s [DCI] analysis 
and coordination efforts… have floundered (p. 186).” The exuberant enthusiasm for James Bond-like 
activities appears enduring in both the official and popular mind, while the many critiques of America’s 
inadequate HUMINT capabilities are partially explained in Zegart’s discussion of organizational 
competition and atrophy. 
30 
It is increasingly commonplace to appreciate that global conditions have changed 
and will be a continuing challenge in the 21st century. Efforts to restructure and refocus 
American defense and intelligence agencies are ongoing, and public and academic 
discussion increasingly exhorts the government to focus on the non-state and asymmetric 
threat of “4th Generation Warfare.” The prevailing assumptions in government of what 
change is required, however, are not necessarily correct or sufficient. It is widely 
appreciated that an overhead image cannot see through rooftops, and therefore overhead 
observation has its limitations. Order of battle intelligence remains essentially the same 
as it always has been (albeit enhanced by high technology); an attempt to gauge the 
permutations of all possible combinations of the friendly and enemy correlation of forces. 
The military’s mainstream intelligence emphasis on order of battle is limited (and always 
will be) by the intangibles of human intent and political motive. The FBI’s domestic 
functions, and the CIA and DOS’s foreign functions, are America’s primary providers of 
that elusive human material. The foreign intelligence operations of the DOS, however, 
are limited by their small number of personnel and their primary requirement to monitor 
the postures, power, and intents of foreign elites. Although its overseas role has expanded 
in recent years, the FBI is likewise limited because its foreign role is primarily engaged in 
specific and focused investigations, rather than intelligence operations per se. As Zegart 
has shown, the CIA’s HUMINT activities have languished under the institutional 
weaknesses, congressionally-mandated constraints, and the vicissitudes of public and 
presidential attitude.24 If one assumes that the CIA is given broader authority, more 
resources, and a more aggressive mandate from senior decision-makers, will that 
necessarily solve America’s HUMINT deficiencies? It would be reasonable to expect that 
an expanded and emboldened CIA would boldly do more of what it has traditionally 
done. Although necessary, enhanced efforts to penetrate hostile networks of declared or 
potential opponents – projects that take years of highly intensive, expensive, and risky 
effort for uncertain results – will be many years in coming. The increased inter-
connectedness of the modern world, and American comparative advantages in high 
technology, increase the appeal of finding a high- tech solution to intelligence problems. 
The advances in high technology and the increasingly interconnected world have made 
                                                 
24 Zegart, A. (1999), pp. 185-222. 
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persons-of-interest increasingly vulnerable to spotting, tracking, exploitation, and 
neutralization. The more an elusive and shadowy network of ne’er-do-wells use the 
benefits of the modern world, the more vulnerable they become to being found. Provided 
there is political will to do so, anything found by American intelligence and reported in a 
timely manner can theoretically be killed. This faith in high technology should be 
exploited to the utmost, but it too has limitations. The task of finding is the true 
challenge, and assuming that high- technology solutions are sufficient to observe, let 
alone understand, the majority of the world’s low-tech population is to assume a too 
rational and too elitist bias in favor of America’s strengths. America should not get tunnel 
vision on the high- intensity and consuming efforts in Southwest Asia. Threats can come 
from unexpected quarters, unlikely opponents, and the unforeseen coalescing of discrete 
trends and interests. That is in the nature of asymmetric warfare. American intelligence 
requires a vision broader than Al Qaeda and the other usual suspects in the counter-
terrorist GWOT intelligence challenge. If Al Qaeda becomes ineffective tomorrow, or if 
America expends its efforts combating it for decades, the threats to American security are 
much larger than Al Qaeda and terrorism.  The current GWOT-driven change and 
structural upheaval of American intelligence agencies may or may not fulfill the need to 
identify and neutralize all of the threats to American security. 
Nor do current efforts at reorganization and restructuring by Secretary Rumsfeld 
to accrue more power to the DOD necessarily promise a panacea solution. Several open-
source efforts have received press and speculation, to include the SSB.  Details of units 
such as these is both classified and beyond the scope of this thesis. The general method of 
employment, however, can be assumed to approach “CIA-like activities” on behalf of the 
DOD without the bureaucratic and inter-governmental political frictions of having to rely 
on the CIA to actually provide the fruits of such activities. Although the DOD already 
controls eighty percent of the intelligence budget,25 such restructuring is an attempt to 
                                                 
25 U.S. Government. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report Of The National Commission 
On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States (authorized addition). New York: Norton. p. 86. 
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increase the mandate of the DOD’s permissible activities into Title 50 responsibilities.26 
The political and organizational turf battles and the legal questions aside, it is reasonable 
to ask what the DOD would do with such an expanded mandate. If it conducts operations 
essentially as the CIA has done – relatively bureaucratic structure at home, small 
representation in foreign posts abroad, with a few operatives sent out beyond the wire on 
focused and discrete missions, it will suffer many of the same constraints the CIA does 
(and probably some new ones). If the intent is primarily to conduct “CIA-like activities” 
at the tactical level, this could prove to be the greatest improvement of battle area 
intelligence (if done well) since the wartime Office of Strategic Services provided tactical 
and operational intelligence to the Army in World War Two.27 The World War Two 
example, however, was a conflict of nation-states with clearly defined sides and clearly 
marked boundaries. The 21st century is a kaleidoscope of change. Tactical exploitation of 
intelligence is fine if America is committed to a specific country for a declared purpose. 
Such tactical operatives can be employed as an adjunct to that specific and declared 
purpose. How will the new units engage the majority of the world outside of a few 
specific and declared national efforts, however? If the intent of any such new units and 
capabilities is strategic, how will they differ in ways from the CIA that would cover 
remote foreign human environments? Will the new DOD units with their CIA-like 
mandate be posted to foreign missions abroad? Will they operate primarily out of foreign 
capitols and major cities in countries where there is no specific and declared purpose for 
                                                 
26 Gellman, B. (2005, January 23). "The secretary actually has more responsibility to collect 
intelligence for the national foreign intelligence program . . . than does the CIA director," Boykin said. 
"That's why you hear all this information being published about the secretary having 80 percent of the 
[intelligence] budget. Well, yeah, but he has 80 percent of the responsibility for collection, as well...." 
Pentagon officials emphasized their intention to remain accountable to Congress, but they also asserted that 
defense intelligence missions are subject to fewer legal constraints than Rumsfeld's predecessors believed. 
That assertion involves new interpretations of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which governs the armed services, 
and Title 50, which governs, among other things, foreign intelligence.... Known by several names since its 
inception as Project Icon on April 25, 2002, the Strategic Support Branch is an arm of the DIA's nine-year-
old Defense Human Intelligence Service, which until now has concentrated on managing military attachés 
assigned openly to U.S. embassies around the world." Prados, J. (2005, March). Pentagon power play: Turf 
wars and bad analysis are just two likely products of the disastrous new intelligence reform. Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists. Retreived May 14, 2005 from http:// www.thebulletin.org / article.php?art 
ofn+ma05prados 
27 O’Donnell, P. (2004). Operatives, Spies, And Saboteurs: The Unknown Story Of The Men And 
Women Of WW Two’s OSS. New York: Free Press. The World War Two OSS, and by extension, modern 
day special operations forces and paramilitary units, have grand strategic, strategic, operational, and tactical 
utility. Although O’Donnell does not make a case for grand strategic utility of such units, his numerous 
historical vignettes offer examp les of their utility at the three lowest levels of scale. 
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such American activity? It may prove awkward and redundant to have such units 
operating from the traditional centers of the DOS and other agencies, and it would likely 
suffer the exact same limitations that characterize those agencies’ unsuitability for 
monitoring remote, foreign, and human micro-environments.  
Even an expanded CIA, and an expanded DOD engaged in “CIA-like activities” 
traditionally conceived, would leave a majority of the world’s area and inhabitants 
virtually unengaged. America’s security and interests in the 21st century may indeed 
require more “intelligence,” but it certainly requires more “information.” Too often 
intelligence is conceived of as only stealing secrets and conducting covert operations. 
The requirement to steal and act surreptitiously will always be there, but most of the 
"intelligence" America has lacked and continues to underemphasize is merely 
information. A majority of this information does not require stealing, it requires 
observing. It does not necessitate risky and desperate operations with sex appeal and 




There are various ways to define engagement. For the purposes of this thesis, 
military “engagement” can be understood to fall into four broad categories: the use of 
military force as combat power, all activities preparatory to military force used as combat 
power, post-combat activities, and peacetime engagement. To understand military 
engagement, it is important to recognize what is central to the military purpose as 
traditionally conceived – what is its particular excellence – and what lies outside of that 
central purpose.  
Clausewitz said that war is intended to compel the enemy to do one's will.28 In 
military terms, offensive military power is the essential force necessary to actively 
achieve that result, and all other activities are supportive adjuncts to that central purpose. 
The three primary services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are functionally designed to 
provide that compelling force on/in the land, sea, and air respectively, and the ability to 
conduct combat in those domains is their raison d’etre. The primary services only have 
                                                 
28 Clausewitz, C. (1968). On War. New York: Penguin. p. 101  
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functional meaning if they are able to maintain those abilities. A 10 million man Army 
would be the world’s largest, but if it consisted of only administrators, cooks, truck 
drivers, and other personnel with support functions, the Army would not be able to 
achieve and maintain its requirement to dominate opponents on land. Likewise, the 
particular excellence of the Navy is to provide the ability to compel one's opponents at 
sea, and the Air Force must be able to do the same in the air. All other elements of these 
services are supportive of the essential elements able to provide this compelling force, 
and thus outside of the services’ main focus.29  
Although rudimentary to the understanding of military art and science, one must 
distinguish between these elements that are able to take the offense from those that are 
merely defensive. Fortifications, naval minefields and anti-aircraft fire may all prevent 
the enemy from achieving his goals, but this is not compelling him to do one's will. 
Rather it is preventing him from compelling one to do his. The Department of “Defense” 
in this light is a misnomer because America, as a great power, has always sought to 
advance its interests in the world, rather than merely ward off the blows of aggressors. 
Even a newly formed and weak American nation preoccupied with defense in the early 
19th century found it necessary to take the battle to the enemy against the Barbary pirates. 
For any nation state that would actively advance its own interests against armed 
opposition and with abilities under its own control, "defense" inherently requires the 
ability to conduct offense. The greater the nation state and the greater its intention to 
advance great interests, the more offensive capability will be required. The leaders of the 
huge service bureaucracies and millions of personnel that are charged with maintaining 
America’s military instrument of national power understand this requirement. They know 
that the ability to conduct offense is a more demanding requirement than merely 
crouching behind palisades (high-technology or otherwise) and waiting. All other 
considerations are theoretically subordinate to this driving organizational imperative. 
Adherence to the offensive imperative creates an organizational mindset in the 
                                                 
29 What these essential compelling elements are has varied throughout history. On land the chariot, 
phalanx, legion, cavalry, cannon, tank, etc., all claimed the dominant role of providing the ability to 
dominate the combat conventions in their eras. At sea, the trireme, man o’ war, steam ship, aircraft carrier 
or submarine have all provided the compelling power for navies, and fighters, bomb ers, and missiles have 
served a similar function in the air. Although the technologies change, and different technologies are 
appropriate to different domains, they all share a common quality: they are able to go to the enemy and 
compel him to submit. 
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mainstream services that Rothstein characterizes as “a kind of DNA”30 which can’t 
fundamentally be altered. Efforts to transform parts of these services that fall outside of 
this archetypal DNA are generally rejected, quarantined, and the pressures to eventually 
return them to the original type are virtually insurmountable.  
Although both understandable and appropriate to maintaining the services’ 
particular excellence, such a mindset has several implications. America’s commitments 
span the globe, and the services must be correspondingly large. Despite the current 
efforts to transform the military from a legacy Cold War force to a more modular, 
streamlined, and flexible instrument, the service organizations remain big. 31 Whether the 
majority of Army land power is massed on the plains of central Europe, the Korean 
peninsula, and a few magnet bases in the Continental United States (CONUS), or whether 
it is widely dispersed in smaller brigade-sized elements, the Army remains big. The same 
is even truer for a Navy and Air Force which have global responsibilities, a technological 
imperative to remain cutting edge, and long lead times for offensive platform hardware. 
Bigness is manifested in a never-declining number of generals and admirals, an enormous 
bureaucracy, and an equally enormous budget. As Allison & Zelikow and Zegart have 
argued, huge organizations move under their own impetus, jealous of their mandates and 
prerogatives, and are tenacious in defending anything that appears to threaten them. 32 
The assumption that bigness is a virtue permeates mainstream service thinking. Rare is 
the general/admiral who doesn’t viscerally believe that wars are won by big battalions, 
                                                 
30 Rothstein, H. (2004, November). Lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA. 
31 Conetta, C. (2003, February 6). Project On Defense Alternatives. Retrieved May 13 2005 from 
http://www.comw.org/pda/ 0302conetta.html. "If September 11 teaches anything, it teaches that spending 
large sums on defense cannot itself guarantee security. Nonetheless, the September 11 attacks prompted a 
steep increase in the Pentagon budget. In 2003, the Pentagon will spend $83 billion more than it did in 1998 
-- a  28 percent increase, after inflation.... It has become commonplace to say that the "world changed" 
fundamentally on 11 September 2001, when terrorists attacked the Pentagon and World Trade Center. 
Actually, it had changed 12 years earlier -- in 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War order 
began to crumble worldwide. With this, the types of threats that had shaped the US military since World 
War II began a precipitous decline -- and a different set of challenges rose to prominence. What preceded 
the 11 September attack was a decade-long failure to adapt the US military to new conditions. And the 
failure continues still.... While the world changed rapidly and radically after 1990, America's armed forces 
did not -- apart from reducing in size. Rather than refashion its tool box to fit new conditions, the Pentagon 
mainstream has tended to view the new era in terms of the types of tools it had on hand at the Cold War's 
end. This, notwithstanding the fact that "transformation" has been a Pentagon watchword since the mid-
1990s." 
32 Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. (1999), pp. 143-160; Zegart, A. (1999), pp. 223-236. 
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carrier battle groups, and fighting wings. “Smallness” is therefore suspect because it 
connotes an insufficiency of means, a supportive and subordinate effort, lack of strategic 
utility, and an inability to force a decision. 33  
The ability to force the decision is also a central assumption in the thinking of the 
big mainstream military. Wars of attrition, position, and maneuver have constituted the 
overwhelming majority of military actions throughout history, but the services must be 
designed to defeat the biggest and most dire threats to national survival conceivable in 
wars of annihilation. A world war with peer or near-peer opponents is the driving impetus 
of how the services are modeled. While waiting for such rare conflagrations to 
materialize, the majority of conflicts of lesser scale and/or of the attrition, position, and 
maneuver type are addressed with elements detached from the world war winning model 
force. The decisiveness assumption still permeates smaller scale conflicts - such as the 
invasion of Panama that deposed Noriega, or the liberation of Kuwait - and anything 
perceived as being unable to force a decision is regarded as apart from the proper 
template of mainstream military activity. 
There are hundreds of non-decisive military actions in the modern world to be 
sure, but these are all seen as something apart from the mainstream military’s reason for 
existence. Small scale contingency operations such as temporarily introducing security 
elements into a conflict area, observer forces, humanitarian  assistance, training of allies, 
etc, are all considered collateral activities. Many of these activities are lumped under the 
rubric of “nation building,” and from the mainstream military perspective it is small 
wonder that they are seen as open-ended, indecisive, wasteful of finite assets, and outside 
of their proper mainstream focus. It is not difficult to understand how much less desirable 
the service would regard the concept of engaging foreign peoples in remote localities 
(and away from anything traditionally identified as a legitimately decisive target) for the 
sake of engagement itself. Moreover, as Van Crevald has outlined in The Transformation 
of War -- and despite all of the contemporary hoopla over transformation -- the military 
remains fixed in Clausewitz’s trinitarian warfare. War is between states which give 
purpose and sanction to war, those wars are fought by state militaries against each other, 
and the people – although providing the foundation upon which both states and militaries 
                                                 
33 Campbell, J. (1988, Spring). Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining The Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine, Armed Forces Journal, Spring 1988. pp. 357-374. 
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rest – are a separate and distinct element from war proper.34 Most 20th century wars and 
conflicts in which America did or might have engaged in were judged by this convention; 
a convention that discounts the human environment or regards humans as a nuisance that 
gets in the way on the battlefield. If one cannot fundamentally accept the idea that most 
wars of the recent past were, and virtually all future wars will be, fought in and for the 
human environment itself, one will continue to undervalue continuous presence and 
engagement. To hold the high ground and strike the opponent’s center of gravity have 
been resilient guidelines in conducting war. In the past, high ground was dirt and the 
center of gravity was some mass or node of state power to be seized, destroyed, or 
neutralized by hard power. In the future, the “high ground” or "center of gravity" for 
"war" -- or the many states of conflict and competition that fall short of war -- is people. 
Addressing the issues of people effectively with soft power must be predicated on the 
understanding through observation that the military too often eschews or de-emphasizes 
in its preference to wield hard power. 
Once one agrees that the mainstream military perceives itself as essentially a big 
offensive organization, designed to achieve decisive results for and against primarily state 
opponents using templated structures and procedures, it becomes easy to see the 
military’s primary view of engagement before and after decisive operations. The primary 
military rationale for engagement prior to the introduction of combat forces focuses on 
the operational requirements of those forces themselves. The military develops its 
understanding of and relationships with an environment to facilitate its own templated 
plans. Understanding is limited by a rationality bounded by a mission spin-up cycle of 
interest (where American forces enter an area of operations (AO) from the outside and for 
specific limited objectives), and satisficed to a greater or lesser degree by time pressures. 
The intelligence developed for any given military mission is typically condensed and 
limited to only those factors, players, and events that appear germane to a given situation, 
                                                 
34 Van Crevald, M. (1991). The Transformation Of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation Of Armed 
Conflict Since Clausewitz. New York: Simon and Schuster. p. 34. "Among military theorists, Clausewitz 
stands alone. With the possible exception of the ancient Chinese writer Sun Tzu, no other author has ever 
been as remotely influential, and indeed to this day his work forms the cornerstone of modern strategic 
thought. His continuing relevance is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that he is one of the few military 
thinkers to whom homage is paid on both sides of what, until recently, used to be the Iron Curtain." The 
assumption on the part of the Bush administration that military victory in Iraq would signal final victory is 
a manifestation of Clausewitzian influence. 
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and could affect the unit, its area of responsibility (AOR), and its current mission. The 
military intelligence agencies will devote a majority of their efforts to answering the 
questions of the commander and filling the gaps of desired information pertinent to the 
given mission and correlation of forces. Unless military presence in the area is routine, 
the gathering and development of consistent and continuous information will be a 
responsibility left to other agencies; invariably the DOS and the CIA. Once any hostilities 
have ended and/or combat forces are withdrawn from the area, the lead responsibility for 
continuing engagement reverts to the DOS. Military intelligence activities, having been 
spun up for and through any military action in an intensive burst of sudden activity, 
usually spin down again as the military action is concluded and the instrument is 
withdrawn. Although the military has unique capabilities to insert into the most remote 
and backward areas of the world, and occasionally a large volume of high-resolution 
information is obtained, these insertions are almost always temporary and immediate-
mission specific. Given the military’s standard engagement progression cycle of spin-
up/spin-down-and-abruptly-disappear, the mainstream military (and even most 
employment of the heralded Special Operations Forces) as traditionally employed is 
unsuited for conducting continuous observation and reporting of human environments in 
remote foreign areas. 
The military not only conducts combat in war and during small-scale 
contingencies, it also prepares for combat and enhances American diplomacy through 
peacetime engagement. Some allies, such as the United Kingdom, Qatar, Japan, and 
Singapore, are engaged on a permanent basis due to the stationing of American 
troops/units and the central importance of these nations to America’s regional and global 
defense plans. America’s military engagement with these countries is virtually permanent 
and conducted through all of the instruments of American national power on a continuous 
basis at the elite state to state level. The engagement of some traditionally strong allies, 
such as Germany and South Korea, are of this type but are relatively on the decline due to 
changing 21st century mainstream military requirements. Other close allies, such as 
Thailand, and the Philippines, do not have permanently stationed American troops/units, 
but bilateral defense exercises are routine, and they therefore host sizeable JUSMAGs to 
facilitate these bilateral exercises. Such engagement is less continuous than the 
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permanent type and marked by the limitations discussed above. Other generally friendly 
and cooperative nations, such as Malaysia, India, Egypt, Turkey, and Columbia will 
occasionally host American troops on a temporary and case-by-case basis. Engagement in 
these countries is continuous primarily through the DOS and other non-military agencies. 
Some countries, like Indonesia and Pakistan, which had previously been in this category,  
are currently not eligible to host American forces even temporarily due to U.S. 
Congressional action or changing international conditions. Some countries, like Vietnam 
and Somalia, do not maintain close bilateral military relations, but will accept temporary 
American military assistance for specific – usually humanitarian – events. Even less 
military engagement is conducted with regimes that are openly suspicious of, or opposed 
to, American interests and policies, such as Burma, China, Syria, Algeria, Mexico, 
Venezuela, and Belarus. Finally, some countries are unequivocally closed to American 
military engagement. In places like North Korea, Cuba, and Iran, even typical DOS and 
other agency engagement activities are severely constrained or totally absent.    
In the types of countries willing to host American military forces on at least a 
temporary and case-by-case basis – even if only for humanitarian assistance – the 
temporary (and limited) engagement results from one of three causes: political initiative 
by the American government when world conditions permit an opening, foreign 
government request for specific assistance with a specific problem, and/or through the 
Geographic Combatant Commanders’ (GCC) Theater Engagement Plans (TEP). TEP are 
developed by the four-star flag officers responsible for American geographic command 
AOs to gain access to select countries, to show military manifestations of political 
support in coordination with American government political initiatives, to enhance 
interoperability with the selected nations, and to enhance American forces’ military 
capabilities. TEP take the form of bilateral and multi- lateral senior- level conferences, 
participation in regional forums concerning defense and security issues, providing 
training to foreign officers in American venues and reciprocal training of Americans in 
foreign venues, the above-mentioned Security Assistance activities, and exercises in 
foreign countries and waters. In some countries, such as the Philippines, Turkey, and 
Norway, all of these activities take place routinely. In most other, at least partly 
accessible countries, varying combinations of these engagements occur but in a 
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disjointed, discontinuous manner. The level of engagement through TEPs does not 
however provide a continuous presence, observation, and reporting of local foreign 
conditions. There are several reasons for this. 
Major bilateral or multilateral military exercises, whether routine like Cobra Gold 
in Thailand or ad hoc such as the multinational naval interdiction exercise off the coast of 
Japan,35 are focused primarily on big unit joint and combined interoperability, political 
accommodations, and the demonstration of bilateral or multilateral state-to-state comity. 
An exercise like Cobra Gold may well include deliberate close contact between American 
military forces and the host nation population through humanitarian assistance, medical, 
and engineering civil affairs activities. These activities are focused primarily on the 
ability of the American units to successfully complete their missions in unfamiliar 
surroundings and demonstrate interoperability with host nation forces. Although the local 
foreign populations who receive the benefits of such activities are likely to be grateful for 
any material improvement, and are often well-disposed to their temporary American 
visitors, these people are, strictly speaking, “the object of the exercise.” Lasting 
observation, understanding, reporting, follow-up, and maintained engagement with the 
local foreign environment and its populations are extremely rare (and when maintained, 
usually done by individual initiative outside the requirements of duty). Therefore, these 
big routine exercises, whatever they temporarily achieve in terms of understanding local 
environments and persuading local populations to be more disposed to Americans and 
America’s interests in the limited short run, are marginally effective for maintaining 
permanent and intimate observation, reporting, and influence on those populations. Such 
big exercise “engagement” is driven by state-to-state political and templated big-military 
interoperability concerns, abstracted-out of any deliberate and purposeful long-term 
global and regional engagement plan, and its local political effects are temporary and 
evanescent.  
                                                 
35 Cobra Gold 2005 Combined Information Bureau (CIB). (2005, April 30). Retrieved May 14, 2005 
from http://www.apan-info.net/cobragold. "Cobra Gold is a regularly scheduled military exercise designed 
to improve U.S., Thai, Singaporean and Japanese readiness and combined-joint interoperability, as well as 
enhance relationships and demonstrate participants resolve to support the humanitarian interests of friends 
and allies in the Asia-Pacific region." 
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Nor do the frequently conducted JCET programs deliberately and purposefully 
maintain whatever temporary rapport is built between American individual participants 
and the local populace. Special Operations Forces (SOF) - especially the Army Special 
Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and to a lesser 
extent Navy Sea, Air, Land, Teams (SEALs) and other SOF - routinely conducted JCETs 
in their assigned theaters prior to September 11, 2001. Such JCETs are typically of one or 
two month’s duration and involve small numbers of these elite personnel deploying into 
foreign host nations to deliver and receive training from their host nation counterparts. In 
virtually all cases, the teams deploy to the host nation from CONUS or a third country, 
and for only temporary periods. Proficient teams study the AO they will deploy into in 
greater detail and with much finer resolution than their mainstream service counterparts. 
The human environment is studied as a matter of threat identification and to establish 
methods of building rapport with their military counterparts and the local populace. All 
members of SF are required to have some familiarity with the languages pertinent to the 
AO. Moreover, through long experience and numerous exposures to many foreign 
nations and environments, individual veterans of SF can develop extraordinary expertise. 
Finally, SF personnel enjoy a reputation for toughness, independence, and resiliency in 
part due to their routine operations in remote, underdeveloped, and harsh environments; 
often amongst dangerous populations. All of these traits lead one to assume that 
American engagement of foreign human environments is adequate to continuous 
observation and reporting of changing conditions. This is very far from the truth. 
Increased frequency of operations into an AO connotes operational capability to 
deploy into and work in the AO, and suggests familiarity with the AO’s environment 
(human and otherwise). Both assumptions are more specious than is readily apparent. The 
common assumption is that the JCET component of TEPs builds a base of understanding 
and institutional knowledge for future use in potential contingencies. Note that this 
“base” is understood in terms of the frequency of JCET iterations conducted by higher 
echelon commands (battalions and above) that deploy the small detachments, units, and 
platforms into the foreign AO, and not necessarily the detachments themselves. 
Occasionally a small element may temporarily enjoy an intimate expertise of a foreign 
micro region that is temporarily unique and superior to any other in American 
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government experience. This expertise fades, however, as personnel turnover occurs and 
the latest in-country experience recedes further into history. In any case, such a “base” of 
understanding and operational familiarity is certainly not understood in terms of the local 
foreign environments and the foreign populations themselves (which are also in a 
constant state of flux). Although commands and units establish an organizational track 
record and reputation for familiarity with an AO, and with practice establish standard 
operational procedures (SOP) for conducting such activities, this “institutional 
knowledge” is not maintained by the inanimate organization.  The people comprising the 
organization are where the true institutional knowledge resides. The tours of military 
personnel in any given unit are limited by both infrequency and finite duration of 
assignment to any given unit. As personnel turnover in any unit, many of these 
institutional insights and capabilities must be relearned. This is one reason why 
commands and units seek to repetitively conduct JCETs: the institutional knowledge and 
area expertise of the personnel currently manning any unit is perishable. 
Beyond the assumption of expertise and the disruptions of personnel turnover, the 
JCET program is disjointed in grand design and inefficient in its particular execution. 
Which countries will be the venues for JCET deployments is determined in a haphazard 
and chaotic manner unsuitable to developing persistent and sophisticated expertise in any 
foreign environment. Which countries are engaged is a function of the GCC’s TEP 
priorities, American political and budgetary constraints of any given fiscal year, host 
nation willingness and interest in hosting such exercises, timing, executing unit 
availability, and other factors. What results from the yearly multi- lateral conferences and 
agreements for JCET planning is driven by ever-changing negotiations, current 
international political realities, and American governmental politics and organizational 
behavior. JCET planning does not proceed from a comprehensive and long-term national 
grand strategy for engagement.  
There are only so many foreign nations willing and able to conduct JCETs with 
American forces. Foreign nations understandably seek to improve their security 
capabilities via JCET events and the negotiations to receive particular kinds of training 
constrain which units may participate in any given iteration. This rationally-driven goal 
of meeting the host nation’s preferences often runs counter to recurring deployment of 
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the same personnel to the same environment with deleterious effects on developing and 
maintaining American expertise. JCET opportunities are further limited by American 
self- imposed restrictions on the type of training that participating units may give and fine 
legal distinctions that require American forces to ostensibly benefit more from such 
training than the host nation does. Such self- imposed legalities are not conducive to 
maintaining consistent forward presence in foreign nations and continuous engagement 
with their populations. There is also only so much money, time, and so many units 
available to conduct JCETs as currently templated (receive the mission, pre-mission 
planning and training, deployment, employment, re-deploy, and recovery and reporting). 
Moreover, all units want to be part of the action and finite JCET opportunities are 
apportioned to the services’ units without regard for an overarching plan to develop true 
expertise in the same environments by the same executing elements and personnel.  For 
example, if “Country X” receives 15 JCETs in a year – and depending on that country’s 
needs and requests – 5 may be apportioned to Air Force units, 5 may be apportioned to 
Navy units, and 5 to Army units. If all 5 units of each service belong to the same Air 
Force squadron, Naval Special Warfare Task Group, or Army Special Forces Group, this 
may seem to be a fair division of opportunities, but it makes little sense if the goal is  
development of routine and consistent expertise of a given country. The Air Force units 
will inherently train small cadres of host nation military personnel on predominantly 
technical skills. Although useful personal and professional relationships will be created, a 
majority of them will not be lasting and this does little if anything to develop micro-
region understanding of the human environment. Navy SEAL Teams are by definition 
designed to conduct (and by extension train) naval tasks. Notwithstanding the benefits of 
such combined training and contacts, the same limitations as apply to Air Force 
engagement apply to the SEALs. In the conduct of their chartered training they are fixed 
on or near the coasts with small sized host nation counterpart units, or actually at sea 
where the human environment by definition does not predominantly exist. Moreover, the 
Air Force and SEALs do not have a charter to conduct unconventional warfare if such 
UW is defined as requiring intimate contact with foreign indigenous populations beyond 
their military counterparts. SF, which does have such a charter, is thus limited in the 
amount of coverage they can devote to any one country’s population by the paucity of 
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opportunities to engage. Moreover, while from the perspective of the SF Group, five 
annual JCETs to Country X in a given year may sound like nearly continuous coverage, 
this is misleading. The opportunities for detachments to engage will likely be spread 
among the Group’s constituent Battalions as a matter of managing work load and intra-
organizational fairness. This spreads familiarization of the theater’s countries among the 
sub units of a Group, but does little for developing and maintaining sophisticated 
expertise in a given foreign environment by an ever- improving sub unit of true experts.36 
The same misperception results at the GCC and theater command level. To the GCCs (all 
of whom are big mainstream service, conventional commanders), 15 successful JCET 
iterations in Country X are 15 iterations of successful military engagement. Whatever 
detailed and sophisticated understanding of the foreign environment derives from this 
“engagement” is a secondary and subordinate concern. 37  
Nor is the typical perspective of the American country team in Country X in 
accord with a GEP. The DOS Country Team and its component agencies (even the 
military) assume that the present and traditional methods of DOS observation, 
assessment, and reporting of foreign conditions are already adequate to America’s 
information and security needs. JCETs are seen at best as an opportunity to advance the 
Ambassador’s plan to interact with the host nation government, and at worst as an 
opportunity for potentially dangerous and/or embarrassing events which may upset his 
plans, and which therefore must be carefully and conservatively constrained in execution. 
Such playing it safe as may then sometimes occur in the Ambassador’s inclination to 
limit the movements of JCET units, is inconsistent with deploying those units where they 
best observe and report on areas of interest. The Ambassador, being the senior American 
official in the host country, may have legitimate reasons for constraining such activity, 
and may for safety or sheer political reasons, constrain where such teams go. This tactical 
                                                 
36 There is admittedly a vital necessity that SF soldiers not be too constrained in their theater 
exposure. To maintain the high quality of SF soldiers they must -- over the course of a career -- be exposed 
to as many of the countries and areas of their home theater as possible.  
37 The reader should be careful to appreciate that this thesis does not argue for the elimination of 
JCETS for any of the services. JCETs are currently one of the best available tools for engagement with, and 
establishing familiarization of, foreign nations. JCETs should not go away! They should however be re-
evaluated for the manner in, and the strategy by, which they are conducted. In the context of this thesis' 
definition of and focus on continuous engagement with foreign human micro-environments, JCETs as 
currently conducted are inefficient and too shallow compared with permanent, intimate, and continuous 
presence of SF in foreign environments. 
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control (TACON) over the location of employment venues is nevertheless inconsistent 
with a deliberate strategy for maintaining continuous observation of all areas in his/her 
country of responsibility.  
Nor do any resident DAO or SAO officials, even if given the Ambassadorial 
latitude to do so, necessarily arrange the placement of JCET teams in areas about which 
even short duration information is desirable. The mandate of such military officials is to 
strengthen the relationship with the host nation military. The locations of JCET events are 
typically dictated by the host nation for their own security sensitivities or the 
requirements of their military development as addressed by bilateral agreement. Although 
it may be desirable to monitor every area of Country X – and any comprehensive 
engagement plan would require that venue selection should be driven by a supporting 
strategy – in fact, the venues selected will correspond instead to the co- location of host 
nation military units, host nation sensibilities, the DOS perception of in-country risk, and 
the political dictates of whatever administration happens to be in control in Washington. 
None of these practices aid in development of continuous and patient presence and 
expertise in, observation of, or reporting about conditions in remote foreign human 
environments as part of a strategic plan for global engagement.   
Such expertise as any specific executing element may gain about the foreign 
environment is further limited by the short duration of actual time in-country and 
exacerbated still by the amount of time, money, and attention paid to merely going to and 
returning from the AO and the specific tasks to be accomplished during employment at 
the foreign site. Even assuming that the selected executing unit is well qualified to 
conduct the mission, a certain specific spin-up/spin-down-and-abruptly-disappear mission 
cycle obtains much as it does in the big mainstream services. Virtually all JCET missions 
arrive in the host nation from out-of-country. This requires international travel planning 
(with all that entails, to include the frequent hassles involved with transporting of 
hazardous cargo, weapons, and other controlled items) which takes up the majority of the 
higher and executing commanders’ leadership focus. The majority of JCET expense is 
routinely devoured by three budgetary categories: transportation to and from home 
station, TDY per diem allowances, and TDY lodging costs, all of which could be largely 
eliminated by placing the units permanently overseas. Such permanent overseas basing 
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not only runs counter to current conventional wisdom,38 -- and redeployment of large 
conventional units with huge signatures, logistical requirements, and expenses may, 
indeed, make sense in light of changing global strategy -- the fundamental rationale for 
permanent overseas presence of smaller and more flexible military forces -- such as SF -- 
demands a grand strategy for global engagement and an unequivocal understanding what 
such a strategy implies, how it can be done, and who should execute it. The goal of this 
thesis is to address these questions.  
                                                 
38 Spencer, J. (2004, September 1). Before the Overseas Basing Commission, The Heritage 
Foundation . Retrieved May 14 2005 from http:// www.heritage.org / Research / National Security / 
tst090104a.cfm. "President George W. Bush announced on August 16, 2004, that the United States will 
alter its overseas basing infrastructure in the coming years. This realignment of forces could affect up to 
70,000 servicemen currently stationed abroad and nearly as many dependants. The President should be 
applauded for this decision, which will advance America’s national security. America’s global basing 
infrastructure must be transformed for several reasons: 1. The current base structure was developed to 
defend against a largely static and predictable enemy —the Soviet Union—which no longer exists; 2. 
Today’s threats —in stark contrast to those during the Cold War—are dynamic and unpredictable, and 
demand flexibility that is currently lacking; 3. A flexible basing structure will promote adaptability in a 
world of diverse political, strategic, and diplomatic interests; 4. America’s commitment to regional stability 
can no longer be measured by manpower alone; 5. A more efficient global basing infrastructure will free 
manpower resources and help to alleviate personnel strains; 6. Evolving military technology allows the 
United States to apply greater amounts of military force over greater distances in shorter periods of time; 
and 7. Diversifying basing infrastructure throughout vital regions will allow the United States to surge 
capability to crisis areas." 
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III. IMPROVING U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES ENGAGEMENT 
IN A POSSIBLE PRACTICAL FUTURE (THE REGIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT CONCEPT), AND A GRAND (CIVILIAN) 
CONCEPTION FOR THE FUTURE (THE GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT 
PLAN). 
From its official inception in 1952, U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) has been 
primarily perceived as a combat unit designed for the often murky concept of 
"unconventional warfare" (UW). Rooted in memories of its antecedent OSS in World 
War Two, various paramilitary and intelligence functions, and guerrilla warfare and 
counter- insurgency responsibilities have dominated the conventional conception of SF's 
unconventional utility.  Since the end of the Cold War, the rationale for, and likelihood 
of, America prosecuting UW as originally conceived has dimmed. SF morphed into a 
provider of disjointed show-the-flag Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions and an 
ever-expanding menu of dissipative collateral capabilities. Many SF commanders worried 
that SF had to strive for relevance to the Army and America in the Post-Cold War world. 
A growing emphasis on Direct Action (DA), commando-like capabilities seems to have 
emerged throughout the Special Operations community, threatening the promise of SF as 
a uniquely structured and strategic instrument for conducting continuous engagement in 
foreign Areas of Operation (AO). The current emphasis on DA attributes threatens to 
mask -- and overwhelm -- the potential of SF to play a much more appropriate and useful 
engagement function in the 21st century.  
What follows is a detailed review and critique of a Regional Engagement Concept 
(REC) written in 1999 by Dr. Hy Rothstein (then an Army SF Colonel). This thesis is 
enthusiastic in its support of the REC; believing it articulates both the true promise of SF 
in continuous, long-term American engagement around the globe, and an evolutionary 
and limited -- and therefore prudent, practical, and eminently achievable -- concept. It is 
admittedly parochial to the needs of a military with responsibilities beyond "engagement" 
broadly-conceived. However, Rothstein has clearly made both the case that the REC (or a 
similar concept) is both useful in and of itself, and foreshadows themes that -- in the 
absence of an REC-like concept -- have currently come to haunt America in Iraq. One 
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recommends his concept be re-examined for the vision it held and continues to hold for 
America's future success in an uncertain world. 
Nevertheless, and by comparison, this thesis asserts a vision that is grandiose in 
the extreme. The author is convinced that while Rothstein's concept is excellent as 
referenced to a military-centric perspective, a bolder, more comprehensive vision for the 
specific purpose of engagement for continuous observation and reporting is required. 
American security is ultimately guaranteed by the military -- a comprehensive total force 
without which America cannot survive. However, America does not and cannot live by 
military might, means, and perspective alone. Relying on a military-centric perspective 
obscures the promise of a wider effort herein coined as a "Global Engagement Plan" 
(GEP). Such a plan would view the world at a level of resolution beneath and apart from 
the traditional view of nation-states to focus on smaller components: community 
groupings herein termed "human micro-environments." Through a newly-created Global 
Engagement Agency (GEA) subordinate to the DOS, the entire world would be framed 
into GEP Areas of Operation (AO) aligned with ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other 
cultural and demographic realities insufficiently covered by traditional DOS observation 
and reporting. This would be the essential focus of a DOS GEP. 
Like Rothstein's appreciation that continuous operations have a quality usually 
missed by the military's (and wider government's) tendency to focus on short-term, 
discrete problem solving, the GEP recommends that engagement should not be just more 
continuous, but be virtually permanent. Therefore a distinct and dedicated cadre of 
operatives would be required for lifetime employment in American global engagement 
activities. This cadre of GEA operatives would be civilians operating overtly; an elite 
collection of American DOS officials selected for, and permanently assigned to, specific 
areas for observation and reporting. Unlike the REC's vision of increased engagement, 
observation, and reporting by SF -- military assets who would continue to be employed 
where and when necessary, based on relatively short-term requirements and under 
military direction -- the civilian operatives of the GEA would be fixed for a career on a 
specific and fixed geographic AO under civilian direction. Successive generations of in-
place GEA Operatives (GEOs) could provide an unprecedented level of observation and 
understanding that would not only improve civilian policy decisions, but would also 
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enhance military understanding and operational plans for specific military tasks as well. 
It is in this context then that the Rothstein REC will be examined as a likeminded 
inspiration and useful foil to the GEP. 
 
A. A POSSIBLE PRACTICAL FUTURE: THE REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT 
CONCEPT 
Rothstein begins by announcing the purpose of the REC; to provide "a coherent 
rationale... [and] a structured operational concept for executing regional engagement [--] 
the military’s participation in the interagency activity of peacetime engagement."39 
Prudent, practical, and professional, Rothstein was interested only in a concept that could 
be operationalized; supporting the wider needs and extant structure of the military at the 
time it was written. 
With a focus on the goal of transitioning from an idea to an accepted 
procedure, [I limit]... the concept of regional engagement to military 
activity....Practicality is the basis for limiting the concept to one of a 
military na ture. While it is tempting to prescribe a concept for interagency 
and multinational operations, there simply is no mechanism for moving 
such a concept from an idea to an accepted procedure. This  progression to 
accepted procedure is the difference between a concept that can drive 
future doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and 
soldier selection and one that is nothing more than an interesting but 
somewhat sterile, intellectual exercise in “what could be.” This [concept] 
pursues the former.40 
However, appreciating that engagement cannot be strictly a military activity, 
Rothstein hopes that such a concept will resonate outside the military. The GEP provides 
one possible solution to the lack of non-military engagement. 
Successful implementation of the regional engagement may serve to 
influence the many other actors involved in peacetime engagement. It may 
lead them to develop and implement generally accepted procedures that 
will mirror (or at least support and complement) those of regional 
engagement as described.... Even if the interagency community fails to 
follow this lead, the concept will serve to enhance the ability of the 
                                                 
39 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. vi. 
40 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. vi. 
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military to contribute to the overall U.S. peacetime engagement effort and 
to fight and win.41  
As a serving senior officer and responsible academic, Rothstein took care to relate 
his expansive concept to specific civilian visions and issues relevant to current Army 
concerns. 
An enduring requirement for peacetime engagement is derived from the 
emerging global strategic security environment and mandated in the NSS.  
Regional engagement  represents a concept for military participation in the 
interagency activity of peacetime engagement. From a military 
perspective, regional engagement makes six important contributions to 
national security. These are avoiding war, informing policy makers, 
maintaining forward presence, facilitating decisive operations, facilitating 
conflict termination and securing the victory, and providing global 
economy of force.42 
And yet, regardless of civilian or military attitudes, the global environment itself 
recommended his study. 
Today’s global security environment is far more dynamic and complex 
than that which characterized the majority of the post-World War II 
period. While the threat presented by the former Soviet Union has 
dissipated, the world is anything but a safer place. A host of new threats 
and challenges has arisen. Ethnic and regional strife abounds. Increasing 
global interdependence, the advent of modern technologies, and the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) all serve to elevate 
what once were items of relatively minor concern to issues with 
significant national security implications for the United States. As security 
concerns are increasing, opportunities to advance U.S. interests are also 
expanding. Trends toward greater democratization and expanding free 
markets are prevalent globally. The resulting interdependence, while 
increasing vulnerabilities, also serves to foster cooperation and provides 
diverse peoples and nations with common interests.43 
Rothstein wrote the concept in 1999 and based it on the vision and authority of 
the 1998 National Security Strategy.44 Nevertheless, the reader should not assume that 
                                                 
41 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. vi. 
42 Rothstein, H. (1999, June).  p. 12. 
43 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 1. 
44 A National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS), The White House, October 1998, as quoted 
in Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 1. 
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the rationale for the REP is therefore somehow outdated; the intent and vision are still 
very much relevant today.  
The goal of this strategy is more ambitious than merely defending against 
imminent or actual threats to our vital national interests. Instead, it 
prescribes a proactive approach to national secur ity policy stipulating that 
“We seek to create a stable, peaceful international environment…”45 
[original italics]. This approach responds to the need to enhance our 
security through more innovative, effective, and integrated actions that 
allow the U.S. to shape the international environment through 
engagement. The “imperative of engagement” resonates loudly throughout 
the NSS. Recognizing that neither the imperative of engagement nor the 
national security are the sole responsibility of the military, the NSS calls 
for an integrated approach which coordinates all the elements of national 
power (diplomatic, informational, economic, and military). The resulting 
broad range of interagency activities undertaken by the U.S. government 
to shape the international environment in order to avert threats and 
advance our national interests is commonly referred to as peacetime 
engagement.46  
Rothstein then provides a working definition... 
Peacetime Engagement: Interagency activities of the U.S. Government, 
either unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with other national or non-
nation state entities, to influence international conditions in such a manner 
as to protect or advance U.S. national interests abroad.47 
Rothstein then shows that the military is responsible for playing a role in 
engagement; citing the 1997 National Military Strategy.48 
The military has an important role in engagement – helping to shape the 
international environment in appropriate ways to bring about a more 
peaceful and stable world.' Both the NSS and the National Military 
Strategy of the United States of America (NMS) reaffirm the commitment 
of the Nation to field a military force that is, first and foremost, capable of 
fighting and winning the Nation’s wars. In defining the U.S. national 
military objectives, the NMS recognizes the equally important mission of 
engagement and the tasks associated with proactively shaping the global 
security environment. The NMS states unequivocally that '…our national 
military objectives are to Promote Peace and Stability and, when 
                                                 
45 NSS, p. 5, as quoted in Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 1. 
46 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 2. 
47 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 2. 
48 National Military Strategy of the United States of America (NMS), 1997, taken from the CJCS 
foreword, as quoted in Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 2. 
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necessary, to Defeat Adversaries.” The NMS goes on to say that “U.S. 
Armed Forces advance national security by applying military power … to 
help shape the international environment…49  
Rothstein then cites the Annual Report of the (then) Secretary of Defense to the 
President and the Congress. 
In addition to other instruments of national power like diplomacy and 
economic trade and investment, the Department of Defense has an 
essential role to play in shaping the international security environment in 
ways that promote and protect U.S. national  interests.50 
Noting that the above vision was expansive, Rothstein observed that the military 
had ample doctrine for warfighting (for which he substitutes the term "decisive 
operations"), but had not given sufficient thought to the interactive mix of such decisive 
operations with  promoting peace and stability, Rothstein then develops the REC as an 
overarching concept for military  operations.51 He proposed the following definition for 
Regional Engagement: 
Regional Engagement is a continuous and proactive regionally oriented 
military activities conducted to gather information or influence 
international conditions in order to protect or advance United States 
national security interests abroad.52 
Highlighting the cruc ial difference between discrete and temporary efforts to 
address a specific problem, he points out that continuous efforts promise to promote the 
equilibrium of stability in a "steady state." 
Significant aspects of this definition include the regional focus as well as 
the continuous and proactive nature of engagement activities. The regional 
focus reflects the manner in which the military organizes, trains, and 
equips its forces; apportions and allocates those forces; and conducts 
operations. This approach does not parallel that of many of the other U.S. 
government agencies involved in peacetime engagement [which present 
challenges for the military].The continuous nature of regional engagement 
implies that these activities are not contingency operations conducted as a 
reaction to a crisis. They are instead steady state operations with activities 
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constantly being executed in support of theater strategic objectives. The 
proactive nature of regional engagement indicates that tactical- level 
activities are part of a coordinated operational- level plan linking them to 
the geographic CINC’s defined theater strategic objectives as articulated 
in his strategic- level Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). Both the TEP and 
the operational- level implementing plan are developed and  executed in 
coordination with appropriate Other Government Agencies 
(OGAs).Regional engagement is usually performed as an integral part of 
an overall interagency effort with the DOD normally in a supporting role. 
Commonly, the Department of State (DOS) will be the lead agency. 
Occasionally OGAs will have the lead, and in rare circumstances, a DOD 
lead will be directed.53 
Rothstein identifies the quintessential difference between the military's traditional 
conception of its role, and the imperative requirement for continuous engagement: 
"influence." 
Appreciating the different dynamics characterizing regional engagement 
activities designed to promote peace and stability and decisive operations 
designed to defeat adversaries is fundamental to understanding the [REP] 
concept....Decisive operations are coercive by nature. They involve the 
direct application of military power to compel an adversary to accede to 
the will of the United States and, when applicable, its allies. Regional 
engagement, on the other hand, is characterized by a different dynamic, 
that of influence. [Original highlighting and italics]. Regional 
engagement involves the discriminate, and often indirect, application of 
military power to persuade, encourage, guide, manipulate, or otherwise 
influence adversaries, allies, or neutrals to act in a manner consistent with, 
or supportive of, U.S. national interests.54  
In a similar vein, he also observes that engagement must be done in relation to 
changing conditions, in the context of a return to the preferred conditions of a "steady 
state." 
When the global strategic environment is conducive to U.S. national 
interests, regional engagement activities provide military input to the 
interagency effort to monitor conditions and predict or report changes.  As 
conditions erode, military power is applied through regional engagement 
activities to influence a return to a more desirable state. When conditions 
further deteriorate, coercive military force may be applied in the form of 
decisive operations to compel a return to acceptable conditions. At the 
operational level, shifting from an intent to influence conditions to an 
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intent to compel change marks the transition from regional engagement to 
decisive operations. The decision to employ  coercive force is made based 
on situation specific criteria and is political in nature. The predominant 
dynamic may not be apparent at the tactical level as discriminate use of 
combat operations may be employed as part of a regional engagement 
effort to influence conditions and behavior.55  
Rothstein takes the overarching and ideal civilian vision of what function 
peacetime engagement is expected to play... 
Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, and 
stopping the spread of disease and starvation brings a sure return in 
security and savings.56 
...and tailors it for a military audience:  
The rationale for the “imperative of engagement” is well articulated in the 
NSS and NMS.  That rationale is reiterated here in an abbreviated form 
tailored specifically to military interests. [italics added]. The rationale for 
regional engagement is not transitory, but rather will retain its validity 
over time.... This assertion is supported by... considerable [Army] 
research....[For example,] ...TRADOC’s [(Training & Doctrine 
Command)]1998 annual report to the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) 
[stated], '[Army] research has consistently validated the continuing 
relevance of peacetime engagement activities for shaping the environment 
in 2025 in a manner supportive of U.S. national and military [original 
italics] interests.'57 
One wonders what result would have occurred if Army research had concluded 
that peacetime engagement was not relevant to the military's interests. In any case, 
Rothstein makes the argument that it is manifestly in the military's interest to embrace the 
REC concept. 
From a military perspective, regional engagement provides six tangible 
benefits related to national security.  These are avoiding war, informing 
policy makers and commanders, maintaining forward presence, facilitating 
decisive operations, facilitating conflict termination and securing the 
victory, and providing global economy of force. Three of these benefits 
(informing policy makers and commanders, facilitating decisive 
operations, and global economy of force) are essential to the U.S. 
military’s ability to fight and win the nation’s wars in the emerging global 
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and national security environment. Consequently, ignoring regional 
engagement requirements and maximizing the U.S. military solely for 
decisive operations is counterproductive to the goal of defeating 
adversaries. Regional engagement, therefore, is not a requirement 
competing with military readiness to fight and win, but rather an integral 
part of that readiness and must receive appropriate consideration in the 
resource allocation process. [original italics]."58 
Each benefit is then explained in greater narrative detail: 
Avoiding War: The old adage “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound 
of cure” sums up this benefit rather nicely.  The advantages of avoiding 
war in terms of preserving resources and saving lives are self-evident. The 
resources expended and lives lost, even in a conflict of short duration, can 
have a catastrophic effect on future readiness, even when victory is 
achieved.  Virtually all professional soldiers recognize war as a recourse to 
be pursued only when other means fail.59 
Informing Policy Makers and Commanders. The second benefit of 
regional engagement relates to keeping policy makers well informed. As... 
forward basing of U.S. forces is reduced, the need for accurate and timely 
decision making by policy makers is increased. Accurate and timely input 
to the policy decision making process may totally avert a potential crisis.  
Equally significant, well-timed decision making is critical to future power 
projection. Even with the enhanced strategic mobility envisioned in the 
future, the tyranny of time and distance remains.  Ample evidence exists 
that our potential adversaries learned well from DESERT STORM the 
danger of allowing the U.S. to deliberately build an unopposed lodgment.  
Delays in decision making resulting from incomplete military information 
will certainly increase the costs of initial entry operations, if not doom 
them to failure.60 
The enhanced situation awareness made possible by regional engagement 
activities permits early and informed decisions by policy makers.  These 
timely and accurate decisions may result in more rapid crisis resolution or 
permit the exploitation of situations in furtherance of U.S. national 
security interests. Early, informed decisions by policy makers significantly 
reduce the risks associated with initial entry operations, support strategic 
preclusion, and are conducive to success in decisive operations. Enhanced 
situation awareness permits military commanders, to include the 
geographic Commander- in-Chief (CINC) and joint and/or combined 
expeditionary force (CJEF) commanders, to refine plans and issue orders 
in a manner that optimizes resources and ensures that objectives are 
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achieved. This applies to regional engagement plans and orders as well as 
those for contingency operations and Major Theater War (MTW).61  
Maintaining Forward Presence Regional engagement presents a politically 
viable and relatively low-cost means to maintain forward presence in the 
future. The absence of the Soviet threat and the growing strength of 
international and regional security organizations renders significant 
numbers of forward-based conventional U.S. forces an increasing political 
liability. Additionally, the costs of maintaining such permanent presence 
have become increasingly difficult to justify. Lacking a common threat, 
the political risks attendant with the permanent basing of U.S. forces in 
countries with security interests and  national objectives potentially 
divergent, if not directly contradictory to our own, are becoming less 
acceptable. Some degree of forward military presence, however, continues 
to have unquestioned value, both in achieving the other benefits listed 
herein and in demonstrating U.S. resolve and commitment.62 
Regional engagement facilitates maintaining an acceptable level of 
forward presence. The small footprint of many regional engagement 
activities reduces political liability to host governments.  The costs of 
small numbers of forward-deployed forces are lower and more responsive 
to resource constraints than those of large conventional forward-stationed 
forces. The flexibility to quickly add or withdraw forward-deployed troops 
reduces the risk of being compromised by the actions and policies of a 
host nation or  third party over which we may have no influence.  
Additionally, changing troop dispositions and force levels through 
forward-deployment can effectively signal U.S. policy and resolve."63 
Rothstein then lists several ways the REC can "facilitate the transition to decisive 
operations; to include initial entry of forces and subsequent combat."64 
Providing Intelligence. Near real-time intelligence provided by military 
“eyes on target” during planning and execution of operations can be 
instrumental in achieving the information dominance generally 
acknowledged as critical to future military operations. Military Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT) provides insights unobtainable through technical 
means (such as an assessment of enemy or allied intent) and is less 
vulnerable to technological counter measures than other intelligence 
assets. Intelligence provided can include, but is not limited to, target 
acquisition, reconnaissance and surveillance of points of entry 
(Drop/Landing zones [DZ/LZs], Beach Landing Sites [BLS], airfields, 
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etc.), reports regarding the location, status, capabilities, and intentions of 
forces, both friendly and adversary, and information about the condition 
and availability of infrastructure and local sources of logistics.65 
Establishing force protection. [Army] research... [has] “…demonstrated 
the clear vulnerability of the deployment process and infrastructure to 
disruptive attacks by a determined adversary.” The traditional concept of 
deliberate force buildup and the future concept of strategic preclusion both 
share this vulnerability resulting from the proliferation of advanced 
military technologies and long-range precision munitions. The REC 
provides a means to minimize these risks.  Use of forward presence 
regional engagement forces to protect and support the force during 
deployment and transition to decisive operations has been demonstrated 
[by such research].to be essential.... The vulnerability of initial entry 
forces to enemy action is reduced through combat actions by forward-
deployed regional engagement forces and defensive source nets, 
particularly near Air and Sea Ports of Disembarkation (APODs and 
SPODs) and Intermediate Staging Bases (ISBs). Additionally, direct links 
to indigenous security forces permit synchronization of host nation and 
deploying U.S. force protection assets to create the most secure 
environment possible. In the combat zone, regional engagement forces can 
establish security on points of entry (DZ/LZs, airfields, BLS, etc.) or on 
critical infrastructure (bridges, dams, etc.). Through their relations with 
indigenous and coalition forces, regional engagement elements can assist 
the CJEF commander in coordinating the early and effective integration of 
the total capability of the multi-national force for force protection. This 
integration of capabilities may include air defense and ground security. 66 
Enhancing coalition operations. Long-term presence and the resulting 
established relationships between indigenous militaries and U.S. forces 
performing regional engagement activities provide a solid foundation for 
forming effective coalitions. Both the need to form such coalitions and the 
difficulty in rapidly achieving effective force integration have 
characterized recent military operational experience and research efforts 
into the nature of future warfare.  [Recent wargames have] highlighted the 
criticality and difficulty of attaining effective early integration of coalition 
forces. In-place regional engagement forces are well positioned and 
prepared to promote total force integration. These forces can provide 
effective liaison, an accurate assessment of capabilities and intentions, 
coordinate intelligence sharing, and assist in establishing integrated 
command, control, and support structures and procedures.67 
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Facilitating in-theater logistics. Future military response to crisis will 
likely include long-range strategic deployment followed by rapid 
employment of forces. This suggests  increased reliance on in-place and 
regionally pre-positioned logistics.  Regional engagement forces are well 
positioned to identify, coordinate, and verify the type, amount, and 
availability of indigenous logistical support, both government and civilian. 
In-place support reduces demands on strategic mobility assets, which in 
turn allows more rapid deployment of combat forces. Additionally, it 
reduces the level of risk attendant to long and fragile logistical support 
channels. Information provided by forward-deployed regional engagement 
forces creates logistical situation awareness and permits integration of 
locally available sources of support into the CJEF commander’s 
operational plan. Regional engagement forces present in the AO are able 
to continually verify the presence and availability of such sources of 
support and secure them for use by U.S. forces.68 
Preempting an adversary’s ability to present the U.S. and the world with a 
fait accompli and achieve a strategic and operational positional advantage 
is core to future force employment concepts for decisive operations. The 
forward presence of U.S. forces performing regional engagement activities 
provides a CJEF commander with in-place resources to counter initial 
enemy actions.  Additionally, regional engagement activities, to include 
advisory assistance and pre-crisis combined training, can significantly 
enhance the capability of indigenous forces to resist initial enemy action 
prior to the arrival of U.S. or coalition reinforcements. Additionally, 
forward-deployed regional engagement forces can coordinate support to 
indigenous forces from early arriving U.S. elements (such as airpower) to 
achieve a synergistic effect that maximizes destruction of enemy 
capabilities. The role of regional engagement forces in enhancing the 
capability of indigenous forces to offer initial resistance can prove 
decisive in attaining strategic  preclusion. The very presence of U.S. forces 
with indigenous forces is likely to signal U.S. resolve to the enemy as well 
as friendly forces, stiffening the indigenous force’s will to resist.69 
Shaping the battlespace. Regional engagement forces made up of trained 
warfighters may be integrated into the CJEF commander’s effort to shape 
the battlespace prior to and during the arrival of initial entry forces. Acting 
on mission orders from the supported CJEF commander, forward-
deployed regional engagement forces can perform Reconnaissance, 
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) functions; conduct direct 
action missions to strip away specified enemy capabilities, conduct 
information operations (IO) attacks, provide terminal guidance for long-
range precision munitions, and conduct stay behind sabotage and 
subversion (unconventional warfare) operations against high payoff 
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targets. Regional engagement forces will be able to leverage future 
integrated global systems of secure communications and fire control.  This 
will permit CJEF commanders to begin engaging targets while still in the 
initial stages of deployment, applying coercive combat power prior to 
closing with the enemy. Regional engagement forces empowered to 
decide, detect, and deliver extended range munitions will be able to 
leverage future global communications and advanced precision munitions 
to execute discriminate target engagement initiated and controlled near the 
point of impact.70 
Establishing initial forward Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) capability. The presence of forward-
deployed headquarters elements of regional engagement forces provides a 
CJEF commander with a vehicle for establishing effective C4I in the Area 
of Operations (AO) immediately.  Additionally, regional Special 
Operations Commands (SOCs) involved in regional engagement activities 
are recognized as providing a unique capability for '…very rapid 
establishment of joint task forces to respond to lower end contingencies.'  
Thus, regional engagement provides a framework for establishing an 
initial C4I capability prior to arrival of a CJEF headquarters or an in-
theater C4I option for smaller scale contingency operations. Even with the 
advent of global communications systems, the advantages to having a 
forward located command headquarters remain. This particularly true with 
coalitions where advanced technologies may not be equally distributed 
and C4I systems and procedures will likely not be compatible. The 
regional engagement C4I structure can be employed to effectively 
synchronize the battlespace during the early stages of force deployment.71 
Facilitating Conflict Termination and Securing the Victory. Decisive 
operations create an environment in which conditions favorable to the 
long-term national security interests of the U.S. can be reestablished.  
Emerging doctrine for Stability And Support Operations (SASO) may 
provide a concept for transition from decisive operations toward steady 
state regional engagement activities. Such a transition, however, must 
move U.S. efforts from the unsustainable short-term level of effort 
associated with decisive operations to a sustainable steady state effort.  
Simply disengaging puts the victory at risk, allowing threats to resurface 
and the opportunity won at such cost to pass. The follow-on steady state 
operations required are those of regional engagement. Rapidly 
transitioning from the coercive conflict resolution force structure back to 
regional engagement forces and command structures permits early 
disengagement.  This early disengagement of the contingency force also 
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reestablishes U.S. capability to respond to new emerging crisis elsewhere 
in the complex multi-polar global security environment of the future.72 
Providing Global Economy of Force. The proliferation of threats in the 
global security environment presents increased risk of multiple 
simultaneous crises’.  Potential adversaries may view a U.S. commitment 
to one or more contingencies as an opportunity to act.  The global 
presence of regional engagement forces outside contingency AOs 
continues to signal U.S. resolve, provides early warning of potential 
trouble spots, and presents a mechanism for resolving a potential crisis 
short of war.73 
Having laid out both the rationale for regional engagement and its utility to the 
military, Rothstein then discusses how it can be conceived in military practice. 
The Regional Engagement Concept (REC) is presented in three parts; the 
characteristics of regional engagement, the regional engagement mission 
area, and the regional  engagement force. [The REC] provides a 
conceptual framework for conducting regional engagement activities [and] 
Specific Doctrine, Training, Leader development, Organization, Materiel, 
and Soldiers (DTLOMS) considerations for implementing the concept.74 
He begins by noting that "the REC is defined by three fundamental characteristics 
critical to its effective implementation. These are continuous operations, unity of effort, 
and human factors dominance."75 
Effective regional engagement activities are characterized by continuous 
planning and execution. The very nature of regional engagement... 
requires that its related activities constantly be in some state of execution. 
Regional engagement is different from warfighting in that the latter 
provides an opportunity for detailed planning supported by battle- focused 
training followed by execution. The basis for conducting regional 
engagement is a time-driven political-operational tempo rather than a 
warfighting event-driven tempo. Planning, control, and tactical execution 
must proceed concurrently and without interruption. 76 
Currently evolving Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs) comprising theater 
strategic planning and defining theater strategic engagement objectives are 
critical to, but do not obviate the need for, operational level planning, 
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objectives, and synchronization. Similarly, independently developed 
country team plans directed by multiple program managers fail to produce 
the synchronization and synergistic effects which allow realization of the 
contributions to national security.... In the absence of a comprehensive 
operational level plan with oversight vested in a sole headquarters, these 
actions may enjoy tactical success and still fail to contribute to theater 
military objectives. On occasion, they can be counterproductive at the 
operational level even while achieving tactical success. To effectively 
apply operational art, the REC calls for establishing a single manager 
[original italics] for regional engagement activities and developing an 
operational level regional engagement campaign plan.  This single 
manager is responsible to the geographic CINC for developing and 
executing the operational level plan linking tactical regional engagement 
activities to the strategic level TEP.77 
Most contemporary futures projects postulate that a Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) has either already occurred, is occurring, or is imminent. 
The theory is that the RMA is principally the result of leap-ahead 
advances in technology, information  technology in particular. Regional 
engagement represents an exception to this trend. While advanced 
technologies will undoubtedly enhance specific capabilities and increase 
certain vulnerabilities, human factors and the human dimensions of 
conflict will likely continue to dominate regional engagement activities.... 
[In] regional engagement, carefully selected, well-prepared soldiers and 
leaders will continue to be disproportionately important relative to 
technology.  The sole exception to this condition related to WMD.78 
Stating that "facilitating policy makers’, military commanders’, and other 
specified individuals’ and organizations’ situation awareness is a principle function of the 
REC,"79 Rothstein then discusses its three inter-related mission "areas" and role played 
by soldiers in each. 
The regional engagement mission area consists of three interrelated 
functions: situation awareness, strategic shaping, and battlespace 
preparation/restoration. Forces conducting regional engagement 
operations perform in one or more of the three roles that directly 
correspond to the three functions. These roles are global scouts, global 
shapers, and global transition forces [original italics].80 
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Situation Awareness: A full appreciation of present and probable future 
circumstances  and the intended actions of relevant parties in a specified 
actual or potential area of operations. This appreciation includes an 
understanding of the impact of those circumstances and intended actions 
on the plans and policies of the U.S. and its allies. Situation awareness 
further includes comprehension of both the intended and unintended 
consequences of U.S. actions, plans, and policies.81 
The REC provides information instrumental to developing full situation 
awareness through two mechanisms. These are the tactical forces 
performing in the role of global scouts and the dedicated intelligence 
architecture designed to obtain and exploit information from global 
scouts.82 
Global Scouts: Appropriately selected and trained U.S. Military personnel 
who, through their  assigned regional engagement activities, are effectively 
positioned and fully competent to observe and report information of 
tactical, operational, and strategic significance.83 
As engagement is predicated on presence, presence provides opportunity to 
observe, observation assumes reporting, and such reporting has many legal intricacies, 
Rothstein goes into some detail concerning the reporting role of the global scout. 
Performing as global scouts, forces conducting missions as part of a 
regional engagement campaign provide a military human intelligence 
(HUMINT) capability by observing and interpreting conditions, attitudes, 
and actions. They provide ground truth to commanders and other 
interested parties. At the same time, these global scouts are  establishing 
personal contacts and developing the regional orientation that will enable 
them to become increasingly effective in performing the other regional 
engagement functions. While future technological developments will 
undoubtedly further enhance already formidable technical intelligence 
capabilities, HUMINT remains the only platform capable of placing 
human judgment at the point of collection. The ability to gather 
impressions, discern intentions, and convey them to persons removed from 
the AO is indispensable in developing plans and implementing actions 
designed to protect and advance U.S. interests. This type of HUMINT 
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intentions and impending actions as well as providing verification,  
context, and background for interpreting data gathered by technical 
means.84  
The HUMINT capability provided by global scouts is sensitive to the 
military related nuances of situations, attitudes, and conditions on the 
ground in areas of national interest. This constitutes a vital supplement to 
HUMINT provided by OGAs and other DOD assets. The effectiveness 
and unique value of global scout HUMINT to the overall information-
gathering apparatus is rooted in two factors related to the military nature 
of the asset. The first of these is that global scouts are from the armed 
forces and are part of its warfighting culture. Therefore, global scouts 
perceive and report information from a military perspective. No other 
HUMINT asset is as well prepared to support the information needs of 
military commanders. The second factor is access. In the United States, 
the uniformed services are, by constitution and law, subordinate to and 
servants of the civil leadership of the government. Dissimilarly, in many 
other nations, the military is involved in numerous aspects of the political, 
social, and economic segments of government and society. The global 
scout’s typical positioning with a host nation’s military invites access to 
activities, institutions, and thought processes not normally available to 
other sources.85 
"Global scouts obtain information by... incidental observation, passive 
reconnaissance, and active collection. Each technique has advantages and disadvantages, 
specific approval requirements and procedures, unique training requirements, and its own 
political sensitivities."86 
Incidental observation is the least politically sensitive of the techniques 
and is employed by all forces participating in regional engagement 
activities. Global scouts employing incidental observation simply perform 
the specific tactical mission that they were assigned. They are not advised 
of any particular information requirements.... Ideally, the global scout will 
not be aware of the specific requirement being fulfilled, even after 
debriefing. These debriefers must also be sensitive to potential information 
“windfalls” that may unpredictably turn up from unexpected sources. This 
technique is entirely passive and completely dependent upon open 
consensual access to information. 87  
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Passive reconnaissance is similar to incidental observation, differing only 
in that the global scout is aware of the relevant information requirements.  
This awareness may come from being sensitized by intelligence personnel 
or through the personal training and experience of the global scout. Being 
cognizant of the information requirement increases the probability that the 
global scout will observe and remember the desired information. The 
distinguishing characteristic of passive reconnaissance is, however, that 
active collection is not authorized or undertaken.  The global scout may 
not initiate any action  primarily designed to acquire specific information 
or deviate in any way from his assigned tactical mission in order to obtain 
such information.  This technique increases political sensitivity and the 
risk that an individual global scout will exceed his authority and vary from 
his stated mission.  Consequently, passive reconnaissance should only be 
employed by mature, appropriately trained, and politically sensitive global 
scouts. This technique is most appropriate for use by SOF or other 
specially selected and properly trained elements. As with incidental 
observation, passive reconnaissance is (as the name  implies) passive in 
nature and dependent upon consensual access to information. 88 
Active collection... carries the greatest risk and highest degree of political 
sensitivity. Active collection is tightly controlled by well-established 
procedures that must be strictly followed. Such activities may compromise 
the individual global scout, the overall regional engagement mission, and 
U.S. foreign policy.  Active collection should be undertaken only after 
careful consideration of the risks involved - and then only when approved 
or directed by the appropriate authority. Any global scout participating in 
active collection requires specialized training and very clear mission 
guidance. This type of activity is normally conducted only where high 
priority requirements exist and cannot be fulfilled in any other manner.  
An example might be HUMINT verification of a WMD threat.89 
Rothstein thus makes an important distinction between the military global scout 
and the civilian and military professional HUMINT operative. The REC does not 
conceive the global scout's role in engagement, presence, observation, and reporting 
primarily as espionage.  
The global scout’s principal tactical mission is not normally intelligence 
collection. In most instances, the global scout will be forward deployed to 
conduct specific tasks or missions. Examples of such missions include 
participating in multi-national exercises or military to military contacts, 
providing training assistance to host nation military forces, or any of a 
variety of other common or evolving peacetime military activities. The 
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generally passive nature of the global scout’s information gathering 
activities does not diminish the value of his presence, the sources or 
information to which he is exposed, or the impressions he develops.90 
He notes that the timeliness of intelligence is related to the architecture that would 
receive and develop it. Although in the REC this seems to be a subordinate point, it does 
indicate a measurement to the extent passive observation and reporting occurs, versus 
more deliberate intelligence activities. 
As alluded to previously, intelligence architecture and procedures for 
effectively exploiting the global scouts are also critical to developing 
situation awareness. This architecture must capture and manage the 
information provided by the global scouts. Doing so requires dedicated 
assets focused specifically on this task. In order to provide timely 
information to the appropriate users, such assets must be fully integrated 
into the national intelligence architecture.  Appropriate information must 
be retrieved from the deployed global scout without waiting until the 
mission is complete. Such remote debriefing is facilitated by leveraging 
emerging information technologies.91 
It is important to note that the information observation and reporting made 
possible by continuous presence, while important, is nevertheless secondary to 
maintaining the presence itself. This observation is important to both the REC and the 
GEP.  
Critical to effective regional engagement is the continuous presence of 
global scouts, employed throughout the geographic CINC’s Area Of 
Responsibility (AOR), particularly in those areas identified for special 
attention in the TEP. Opportunities must be seized, or created when 
necessary, to ensure that global scouts are able to maintain continuous 
presence. Access and region (or country) specific orientations are not 
automatic or rapidly generated.  This creates a requirement to maintain 
some level of presence throughout the region, even in areas not specified 
as high priority in the TEP.92 
Commanders and planners develop thorough situation awareness based on 
information provided by the global scouts and integrated with information 
from all other available sources. They use this situation awareness to 
refine regional engagement campaign plans,  producing and implementing 
orders for actions to avert potential crisis and exploit opportunities to 
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advance U.S. national interests. Each individual operation should be 
closely examined to ensure it contributes to operational- level regional 
engagement objectives and to assure synchronization with other ongoing 
or planned missions. All plans and operations must be supportive of, and 
carefully synchronized with, the objectives of interagency peacetime 
engagement in the region. 93 
Rothstein next discusses the function of strategic shaping and global shapers. 
Strategic Shaping: Military actions taken to resolve potential crisis short of 
decisive operations or to exploit opportunities to advance U.S. national 
security interests.94  
The operational and tactical level activities conducted in accordance with 
these plans and orders comprise the function of strategic shaping within 
the context of the REC. Such activities may include, but are not limited to, 
defense cooperation, unilateral, joint, and multi-national training, 
joint/combined/multi-national exercises, humanitarian relief actions, 
advisory assistance, infrastructure development, security assistance, and 
technical support. These activities may be initiated in support of a variety 
of engagement objectives ranging from war avoidance to simply 
advancing specified U.S. interests. Strategic shaping activities may be 
designed for purposes as diverse as deterring potential aggressors or 
developing infrastructure to enhance U.S. economic interests in a region.  
Infrastructure development may also serve to prepare facilities for use by 
U.S. forces in response to a future crisis. Synchronizing such activities 
with contingency plans can optimally manage resources, accomplishing 
multiple objectives simultaneously."95 
"The REC envisions accomplishing such strategic shaping using forces acting as 
global shapers.  Global shapers are soldiers drawn from throughout the military forces 
structure. Force selection should leverage organic capabilities developed for wartime 
tasks whenever possible."96  
Global Shapers: U.S. military personnel, deployed abroad in peacetime to 
perform tactical missions as part of an operational level regional 
engagement campaign designed to shape the strategic environment for the 
purpose of avoiding war or advancing u.s. national interests.97 
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In discussing the global shaper, Rothstein highlights the importance of their 
unique military mindset. This is reminiscent of Clausewitz' genius for war,98 and is an 
important observation for both the REC and the GEP. It also highlights the political 
nature of such soldiers and roles as distinct from the "social worker" pejorative. 
The basis of the uniqueness and value of the global shaper, as with the 
global scout, is his military background and links to the warfighting 
capabilities, resources, and culture of the Armed Forces. The military is 
not intended to be a “uniformed Peace Corps” or to duplicate the 
capabilities of non-governmental or private volunteer organizations 
(NGOs or PVOs). It is imperative to identify those functions and activities 
that are optimally performed by the military (due to access, special 
capability, or threat condition, among other factors) while avoiding those 
activities best performed by other organizations.99 
Essential to achieving a close alignment of unique military capabilities 
with regional engagement strategic shaping requirements is identification 
of a core group of military regional engagement professionals.  These 
professionals should be thoroughly familiar with capabilities, roles and 
missions of the military as well as those of other governmental and non-
governmental organizations.  Such forces should be drawn from 
organizations whose wartime missions closely align with the requirements 
of regional engagement.  SOF is a potential source for such a cadre of 
professionals.100  
Critical to the concept is the strategic shaper’s ability to act as a force 
multiplier. He  works with foreign military, paramilitary, and civilian 
counterparts to achieve positive results disproportionately large in 
comparison to the U.S. investment of resources. Deployed regional 
engagement elements continue to perform the role of global scouts  even as 
they enter the more operationally proactive mode of strategic shapers.101 
Rothstein then discusses Battlespace Preparation/Restoration and Global 
Transition Forces 
Not all wars are avoidable. When influence fails to achieve a set of 
circumstances  acceptable to U.S. political leadership, the coercive 
capability of the nation must be employed and the armed forces may 
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conduct decisive operations to impose acceptable conditions. The REC 
provides forward-deployed forces permitting the geographic CINC or his 
designated CJEF commander to begin to create conditions supportive of 
his operational plans prior to, or concurrent with, deployment and 
employment of the main force. Similarly, regional engagement forces can 
facilitate the early withdrawal of decisive operations forces and the 
transition back to the steady state activities associated with the regional 
engagement functions of strategic shaping and situation awareness. This 
return to steady state regional engagement functions is essential to secure 
the victory.102 
Battlespace Preparation/Restoration: Battlespace preparation comprises 
activities of the forward-deployed regional engagement forces to establish 
conditions that enable initial entry and decisive operations by forces 
capable of defeating an adversary. Battlespace restoration comprises 
activities of regional engagement elements to expedite the withdrawal of 
forces following decisive operations.  These activities facilitate transition 
to the steady state regional engagement functions of strategic shaping and 
situation awareness in order to secure the victory. 103 
Traditionally large-scale contingencies and MTW have required that an 
initial lodgment be established to permit overwhelming force to be massed 
in theater.  Decisive operations were initiated only after adequate forces 
and supplies were in place.... The term strategic preclusion represents the 
idea of introducing forces so rapidly and with such lethality that an 
adversary cannot gain or consolidate a significant operational advantage.  
It involves use of strategic maneuver whereby forces are deployed from 
the Continental United States (CONUS) support base through ISBs and 
directly into combat. These concepts are rendered feasible by leveraging 
future advanced technologies and concepts for strategic mobility and 
logistics. The benefits of regional engagement in terms of force protection 
and battlespace preparation... are increased when strategic preclusion is 
attempted. The long and fragile logistics support channels required, 
coupled with the commitment of forces to combat prior to massing 
overwhelming force, place even greater importance on the presence of 
forward-deployed forces positioned to facilitate initial entry operations.104 
Global Transition Forces: Regional engagement forces preparing or 
restoring the battlespace are referred to as global transition forces. [These 
forces are] regional engagement forces forward deployed prior to decisive 
operations, or remaining deployed after decisive operations, in a 
contingency or MTW AO. These forces assist in establishing conditions 
conducive to success prior to initial entry and decisive operations. 
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Following decisive operations, they assist in establishing the conditions 
conducive to a return to steady state regional engagement activities and 
long-term success.105  
The continuous employment of regional engagement forces envisioned by 
the REC provides for the presence of global transition forces in virtually 
any potential contingency AO. Adequate force structure to maintain a 
large presence in every corner of the globe does not exist. The REC, 
therefore, calls for prioritizing resources, maintaining minimal forces 
acting as global scouts where crisis is improbable and increasing presence 
as a situation deteriorates.  The enhanced situation awareness provided by 
global scouts permits accurate and timely reallocation and adjustment of 
the disposition of regional engagement forces. Global transition forces 
leverage their warfighting skills, forward presence, and prior mission 
activities to provide real- time HUMINT, force protection, strip away 
enemy capabilities, delay enemy set, facilitate coalition integration,  
provide early forward C4I, and verify and obtain indigenous logistical 
support.106  
In reiterating the importance of achieving the equilibrium of a "steady state" 
before and after a transition to/from decisive operations, Rothstein notes the flexibility of 
REC forces. 
The sequential and concurrent performance of all three regional 
engagement roles (global scouts, global shapers, and global transition 
forces) and functions (situation awareness, strategic shaping, and 
battlespace preparation/restoration) is fundamental to the concept of 
regional engagement. For example, regional engagement forces acting as 
global scouts may transition to the role of global shapers, but will continue 
to serve as global scouts as well.107 
The transition from regional engagement to decisive operations within a 
specific geographical area requires that appropriate portions of forces 
previously deployed for regional engagement shift to their wartime 
missions and be integrated into the CJEF. The wartime mission profiles of 
SOF are conducive to such a transition, again highlighting the utility of 
SOF in regional engagement. The forward presence of SOF in a regional 
engagement role facilitates performance of their wartime missions of 
Unconventional Warfare (UW), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct 
Action (DA), unconventional assisted personnel recovery, and coalition 
support. Consequently, regional engagement activities do not preclude 
involved forces from performing their wartime missions. Additionally, 
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some SOF, principally civil affairs (CA) units forming part of the forward-
deployed regional engagement force, are uniquely prepared and positioned 
to support population and resource control (PRC) and humanitarian relief 
operations. These activities may include refugee management and 
coordinating the role of NGOs and PVOs within the AO.108 
The versatility of engagement forces benefits the limited expenditure of decisive 
forces and promises a speedy restoration to the steady state. In the context of American 
and coalition activities in present day Iraq and elsewhere, the utility of Rothstein's 
concept seems particularly prescient. 
Battlespace restoration facilitates the withdrawal of contingency forces 
and the resumption of steady state regional engagement activities. As 
forces are withdrawn, global transition forces remain with the 
respons ibility to secure the victory during transition back to the steady 
state functions of strategic shaping and situation awareness. Immediately 
withdrawing forces following decisive operations may imperil the gains 
achieved by such actions.... [Moreover,] in the multi-polar world of today 
and the future, long-term commitment of the limited U.S. forces capable 
of conducting decisive operations engagement type activities does not 
support U.S. national security interests. Neither does it make effective use 
of these resources.  The potential for crisis’ erupting in other locations 
demands that such scarce national resources be withdrawn and 
reconstituted as expeditiously as possible. This challenge suggests the 
return of responsibility for the contingency AO to regional engagement 
forces acting as global transition forces as soon as the threat, conditions, 
and political considerations will permit. Global transition forces will 
conduct the following types of activities, among others, to secure the 
benefits of regiona l engagement [:]....Security operations. In conjunction 
with host nation forces, global transition forces retain adequate combat 
power to deal with isolated incidents of resistance and secure borders.  
The level of combat power in the global transition forces may be adjusted 
to match the threat level relative to the capabilities of host nation security 
forces [;] Infrastructure restoration. The global transition forces, in 
coordination with other available organizations (governmental and  non-
governmental), begin work to restore host nation infrastructure to foster 
stability and further U.S. interests. Military capabilities should only be 
applied to those efforts where other agencies are unable to perform such 
missions [;] Humanitarian assistance. Following decisive operations, the 
commander’s moral and legal responsibility to the civil populace, 
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demands that every effort be made to ensure civilian access to adequate 
human services. The global transition forces assume responsibility for 
these requirements.109 
The ultimate objective of global transition forces is to transform 
seamlessly back into the roles of global shapers and scouts.  This 
transition can only take place following the completion of large-scale 
SASO performed by the CJEF immediately following the successful 
conclusion of decisive operations. The return to steady state regional 
engagement operations signals operational and strategic success. In 
summary, regional engagement forces acting as global transition forces 
facilitate the transition to and from decisive operations by means of 
battlespace preparation and restoration. These activities can be 
instrumental to the success of decisive operations and in ensuring the 
long-term victory.110 
Rothstein repeatedly reiterates the central theme that engagement operations thus 
conceived must be continuous. 
The REC defines regional engagement activities as continuous. Even 
during the conduct of decisive operations within a contingency or MTW 
AO, regional engagement activities continue throughout the remainder of 
region and world.  These activities serve the dual purposes of global 
economy of force and strategic/operational protection of the contingency 
commander’s 'flanks' and 'rear.'111 
Nor are the benefits of engagement simply abroad. Although writing in 1999, 
Rothstein has already identified the utility of the REC in supporting Homeland Defense. 
Regional engagement supports homeland defense in a manner similar to 
that in which it supports decisive operations. Global scouts can provide 
early warnings and indications from Outside the Continental United States 
(OCONUS) that may assist planners and operators in preparing for and 
conducting homeland defense operations. Further, global scouts can 
provide insights and information regarding the culture, intentions, 
methods, and capabilities of threats to the U.S. homeland from OCONUS. 
Global shapers may be able to intercept or otherwise influence a potential 
threat to CONUS, acting unilaterally, through, or in concert with foreign 
forces. In some cases, resolving the underlying causes of a potential or 
emerging threat to security of the homeland may eliminate the peril. 
Global shapers are positioned to perform this function. Global shapers 
may be able to identify imminent threats to the U.S. homeland, determine 
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their intentions, or even 'canalize' their approach. They may be able to 
neutralize the capabilities of certain adversaries, an especially critical 
function in the case of those capabilities and adversaries difficult to 
identify or attack domestically.112  
Having laid out the rationale, military utility, characteristics, and roles, Rothstein 
then outlines an intuitive force structure and a reasonable system of command 
relationships. 
In order to provide the single manager required by the REC, a Regional 
Engagement Force (REF) must be established. The REF serves as the 
geographic CINC’s operational level headquarters for planning, control, 
and execution of the theater regional  engagement campaign in support of 
the strategic- level TEP.... REFs are formed on the basis of one per 
geographic CINC and are comprised of a dedicated standing joint 
headquarters staffed by regional engagement professionals with assigned 
or apportioned core and supporting regional engagement forces..... These 
core forces are augmented with appropriate supporting units from the 
conventional force structure. Regional engagement supporting forces may 
include combat, combat support, and combat service support elements 
from any service.... To ensure that the commander and key elements of the 
REF staff meet the profile of regional engagement professionals, the 
theater Special Operations Command (SOC) provides the nucleus for, and 
exercises OPCON of, the REF.... The SOC commander is dual-hatted as 
the REF commander....Creating a subordinate JTF to act as the REF and 
plan, control, and execute the regional engagement campaign permits the 
SOC to remain actively engaged in the theater war planning process.... 
Subordinate JTF’s may be established under the REF for specific 
missions.... In addition to forces OPCON to the REF, other joint and 
service forces may participate in the regional engagement campaign in the 
course of their activities.... The REF has a joint support element to 
coordinate service support to the various subordinate joint tactical 
elements conducting regional engagement activities.... The REF staff is 
characterized by robust liaison, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil 
Affairs (CA), intelligence, contracting, and communications cells as well 
as senior representation from OGAs (e.g. DOS, United States Agency for 
International Development [USAID], and others as required)."113  
 
The Army component of the REF would be a Special Operations Group (SOG). 
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Figure 1.   REC: Special Operations Group; Army Component of Theater SOF. (From: 
Rothstein, H. (June 1999). Regional Engagement: An Army Special Operations 
Forces Approach To Future Theater Military Operations, p. 49. Fort Bragg, NC: 
USAJFKSWCS Battle Lab. 
 
Note that the SF, CA, and PSYOP units are co- located under the same structure  
The SOG’s organic core regional engagement forces include SF, PSYOP, 
and CA units. These units comprise the SOG’s assigned forces with 
supporting forces attached or  OPCON as required. Special Operations 
Aviation (SOA) and Rangers are normally globally apportioned, but may 
be assigned or attached to the SOG as core or supporting regional 
engagement forces based on mission requirements.... The SOG possesses 
the full range of SF capabilities.... The SOG’s organic SF units provide the 
C4I and support framework for deployed elements performing regional 
engagement missions.  SOG SF units are structured to accept attachment 
and provide C4I of other SOF and supporting conventional forces.... The 
SOG’s organic PSYOP unit(s) is the forward-deployed element of a global 
PSYOP force structure. In accordance with future PSYOP operational 
concepts, this element is relatively small, leveraging future advanced 
technologies to rely on “reach back” capabilities to a strategic PSYOP 
Group in CONUS for much of its capability.  It provides the bulk of the 
REF’s organic PSYOP capability and is structured to function as a joint 
PSYOP headquarters synchronizing all REF PSYOP assets.... The SOG 
features a robust organic AC CA structure and reinforcing RC units 
specifically organized and equipped to satisfy regional engagement 
requirements.  Each SOG’s organic CA units are tailored to meet the 
anticipated demands of its specific region. Each SOG will have an 
assigned AC CA element to coordinate all regional engagement CA 
functions within the assigned area. This element, comprised largely of CA 
generalists will also satisfy immediate response CA requirements 
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throughout the region until the specialists resident in the larger RC CA 
units can be mobilized and deployed to the respective theater.114 
Rothstein then discusses the component and tactical command and support 
relationships. 
SOF service components and their subordinate elements comprise the 
previously described core regional engagement forces... Tactical regional 
engagement activities are conducted by subordinate elements of the 
REF.... normally task organized based on specific mission requirements. 
These elements may be service pure or joint. Both SOF and regional 
engagement forces often operate as joint elements at the tactical level. 
Tactical elements are formed using SOF core regional engagement units as 
a basis for the task-organized units. These core SOF units provide the 
regional engagement specific skills and capabilities (such as cultural 
awareness, language proficiency, regional orientation, etc) for the task-
organized units. Supporting conventional forces are attached or OPCON to 
these SOF elements.115 
Having laid out the need for to put the REC into operation, Rothstein nevertheless 
cautions against irrational exuberance; the REC is suitable for some important reasons 
and should be implemented, but it is not a replacement for decisive forces. He states that 
the REC... 
...is not intended to suggest that America’s military should be optimized 
exclusively or  even primarily for regional engagement. There are those 
who would be tempted to argue that the 'most likely use of military forces 
in the next 5 to 10 years will be in the ‘nontraditional’ category or 
‘unconventional combat,’. Even if this prediction is true, we cannot afford 
to maximize U.S. military forces for only one band of strategic 
requirements. On the contrary, the results of the Quadrennial Defense 
Review point to a need for a “capabilities-based” military force that is full 
spectrum in nature with a full set of capabilities to execute our national 
security strategy. Experience has proven that a “prevent and deter” 
capability has no meaning without a balanced “deter and fight” capability. 
The REC does not argue for a bifurcated force—one that fights wars and 
one that executes operations other than war. Rather, it is an argument for a 
force structure optimized from a holistic point of view, recognizing the 
interdependence of operations across the continuum.116   
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Finally, and of significant interest to the GEP, Rothstein then makes practical 
recommendations for how to evolve a REC capability through focused efforts concerning 
doctrine, training, leader development, organization, material, and soldiers (DTLOMS). 
These efforts in the context of the REC as conceived are unobjectionable and would be 
appropriate -- in fact necessary -- for the strictly military aspects of enhanced 
engagement. The one area of Rothstein's prescription that bears further emphasis are the 
individual characteristic, attributes, and skills necessary and their corresponding training 
requirements. Engagement in often remote, poor, harsh, and sometimes dangerous sub-
state environments demands soldiers with the traits common to SF. Civilian DOS 
operatives of a GEA would require most -- if not all -- of the same skills. In fact, such 
civilian operatives -- operating with only limited support from the embassy and being 
without the support typical of deployed soldiers -- would need to be unusually 
resourceful to be effective (and even, in some cases, survive). Since SF soldiers already 
have these traits, it seems reasonable to seek the nucleus of a new GEA in the ranks of 
retired or transitioned SF soldiers. Rothstein first identifies the fo llowing SOF and 
individual characteristics that already align with the requirements for conducting regional 
engagement: 
[Personnel should be] mature professionals with leadership abilities; 
[Have] specialized skills, equipment, and tactics, Regional focus, 
Language skills, [and] Political and cultural sensitivity. [Moreover, units 
should be:] Small, flexible, [and with a] joint-force structure. 
{Furthermore; SOF should be able to: ] Be tasked to organize quickly and 
deploy rapidly to provide tailored responses to many different situations; 
Gain access to hostile or denied areas; Provide limited security and 
medical support for themselves and those they support; Communicate 
worldwide with unit equipment.; Live in austere, harsh environments 
without extensive support; Survey and assess local situations and report 
these assessments rapidly; Work closely with regional military and 
civilian authorities and populations; Organize indigenous people into 
working teams to solve local problems; Deploy at low cost, with a low 
profile and less intrusive presence than larger conventional forces.117 
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All of the above attributes are expected of currently-fielded SF units. Rothstein 
also identifies several skills that are non-traditional to the larger military (but common in 
SOF) that would require emphasis in the selection and training of effective REC (or GEP) 
soldiers. 
The first and overriding individual training requirement for core regional 
engagement professionals is competence in U.S. tactics, techniques, 
procedures, and doctrine for decisive operations.  This understanding of 
conventional force operations is the foundation for the effectiveness of the 
global scout, global shaper, and global transition forces. This common 
theoretical and cultural experience is what sets the global scout apart from 
other HUMINT sources.  It permits synchronization of the actions of the 
global shaper and transition forces with the potential requirements for 
decisive operations in an AO based on common understanding of 
operational procedures and tactics. Conversely, many of the individual 
training requirements for regional engagement emphasize non-traditional 
skills, not routinely found in the military, particularly outside of SOF. 
Among these are: Regional orientation; Cross cultural communications; 
Sustained operations in austere environments; Sustained operations in 
isolation from other U.S. personnel or forces; Organization, capabilities, 
and procedures of OGAs; Expertise in the organization, capabilities, and 
procedures of NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations (e.g. the 
United Nations and regional security organizations); Civil-military skills 
such as advanced medical capabilities (to include training as an 
independent healthcare practitioner), civil engineering skills related to 
third world infrastructure, and civil administration; Political sensitivity 
(aware of both U.S. and indigenous political environment); Operations in 
low-tech/no-tech environments; Urban operations (specifically urban UW 
and Foreign Internal Defense [FID]); Intensive intelligence training to 
support the global scout role; Language proficiency; Negotiation skills; 
[and Information Operations] IO."118  
These attributes are suitable and desirable for the strictly military context of the 
REC. The same attributes would be preferable in civilian GEP operatives as well.  
 
1. Summary of the REC 
Rothstein's REC concentrates on human qualities, continuous engagement, and a 
holistic conception of maintaining persistent presence in foreign areas. The REC provides 
a concept for understanding foreign environments, forewarning of possible threats 
coming from them, and influencing those environments to meet American interests. The 
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REC is an excellent vehicle for preventing strategic surprise and maintaining and 
securing the strategic initiative. 
However, it is understandably but fatally referenced to a predominantly military-
centric perspective. Military assets must change their posture in response to changes in 
American policy and international conditions. Although such changes are understandable, 
the frequent movements of military assets and their general impermanence are not 
conducive to plans for continuous presence and observation. Although bits of the REC 
concept surface occasionally in military thinking -- and USSOCOM could adopt the REC 
if it so chose, it has not yet been adopted as a mainstream military belief. Despite the 
manifest virtues and indirect promise of the plan, the military has not yet demonstrated 
that it has a preference for other than short-term instrumentality. The REC is likely to 
remain too narrowly conceived by the military as a marginal and uncomfortably strange 
adjunct to conventional military thinking. 
 
B. A GRAND CONCEPTION FOR THE FUTURE (THE GLOBAL 
ENGAGEMENT PLAN). 
The REC -- being kindred in spirit and intent with the GEP -- has been reviewed 
in some detail for its general wisdom and specific points of agreement and divergence. 
The following proposal for a GEP is not an argument that the REC is in any way wrong. 
It is an argument that the GEP is broader in scope, and places emphasis on a less directly 
instrumental and more fundamental starting point for American engagement in the world: 
permanent civilian presence in, continuous observation of, and sophisticated and 
unbroken streams of reporting on foreign human micro-environments. The REC's vision 
of utility is rooted in the instrumental focus of the military generally, the Army 
specifically, and military elements reporting ground truth to policy makers for the 
purpose of finessing better security policy. The GEP applauds and includes this vision. 
The GEP however, is civilian controlled. Although GEP operatives would require 
the toughness and military virtues of the best current SF soldiers to succeed -- and this 
thesis assumes that early generations of GEP operatives would be heavily represented by 
former military personnel -- the GEP does not regard continuous engagement in reference 
to -- or relevance through -- military power. Resident in the DOS, the GEA would be an 
78 
extension of the American overseas missions' observation and reporting. It does, 
however, differ somewhat from the traditional conduct of DOS activities. Whereas DOS 
missions are assigned to capitols and major foreign cities, and conduct a majority of their 
activities through the foreign elites centered in those foreign centers of power, GEA 
operatives would extend the observation and reporting ability of embassies to sub-state, 
predominantly non-elite areas. The GEP is based on the fundamental premise that DOS 
GEA operatives would provide useful information to the American country team by 
being permanently assigned to fixed areas for observation and reporting Such DOS 
augmentation, and the more comprehensive information-gathering coverage it would 
provide, should lead to better engagement by other instruments of American power.  
The Rationale for a GEP. 
The Global Engagement Plan described herein is based on several key 
assumptions: 
1. The Regional Engagement Plan (REC) as described by Rothstein -- or a 
military plan very similar to it -- would provide a tremendous improvement in American 
military engagement. Despite the REC's conceptual argument for permanent and fixed -- 
and therefore reliably continuous -- American presence in many more areas of the globe, 
however, USSOCOM has so far not embraced such a concept. Moreover, it is limited by 
its military-referenced nature because the military tends to focus on more short-term 
instrumentality than continuous presence to fixed AOs. A new concept (the GEP) is 
intended to provide such permanent, fixed, and continuous presence with civilian 
operatives as an augmentation to DOS embassies, and with a charter to engage and 
understand fixed foreign areas. The GEP does not demand revolutionary change. It 
simply extends the mandate of existing American missions abroad. 
2. The world will continue to integrate (or "globalize") more densely, and will be 
perceived as "contracting" by all the world's people; even if such perception occurs at 
different times, different rates, and with different conclusions for integration's 
significance. 
3. Such globalization consists of increased connectedness with interaction 
between, and awareness of, nations, states (and their politics defined narrowly), politics  
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(broadly defined as interactions between human beings); economic systems, actors, and 
relationships; and social systems and norms (including value systems, philosophies and 
religious belief and conduct). 
4. Actors will continue to pursue and order their own interests in accordance with 
their charter, raison d'etre, particular excellence, and/or for selfish reasons. Barring a 
purposeful initiative, such actor behavior represents an environment of chaos. 
5. Despite prognostications implying the contrary, 119 states will continue to exist 
for the foreseeable future, combining political authority, military/coercive and economic 
power, and the inertial advantages of traditional human ordering. States will continue to 
be the most powerful actors on the world stage. 
6. Nevertheless and as widely observed, other actors and forces are increasingly 
perceived as complementing, challenging, threatening, or even potentially obviating the 
state.120  
7. Human interaction occurs at many levels and in many dimensions. Analysis on 
the "life of the state" can be deconstructed or "suprastructed" at different levels of 
resolution. Therefore the traditional, two-dimensional, rational actor concept of state -to-
state (regime-to-regime) relations as the only level at, and paradigm through which, 
national matters of importance are ultimately important and can be understood is 
contestable.  
8. A GEP, and the DOS Global Engagement Agency Operatives (GEOs) who 
would conduct it, can provide observation and reporting coverage of heretofore largely 
neglected/underreported environments below and apart from the traditional state-to-state 
focused effort of current American organizations and observers.  
As noted and critiqued in chapter two, traditional American representation to 
foreign countries is state-to-state (regime-to-regime) through the American embassy. In 
many cases, larger and more important states will see the American embassy augmented 
by consulates. The American "Country Team" (Department of State and other official 
USG personnel) is habitually clustered in the vicinity of the American missions. It is in 
these concentrated areas that most official American personnel spend the majority of their 
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tours in-country. Other than routine and normal relations between the embassy/consulates 
and the organs of the host nation government, observation -- and reporting based on 
direct observation -- is confined to the small area in the immediate vicinity of the mission 
sites (See Figure 2). Reporting to senior policy makers in America is mostly channeled 
through the Country Team.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Current/Typical Areas of Routine Coverage. 
 
Ground truth in reporting conditions in the wider host nation is deliberately and 
consciously augmented and multiplied by developed ties with co-operative host nation 
nationals. These nationals are assumed to have access to current and reliable information 
beyond that which mission personnel have the time, ability, and access to collect for 







Figure 3.   Current/Typical Areas of Routine Coverage by Indigenous Co-Operatives. 
 
Whenever the embassy requires information on a specific issue of current interest, 
the mission can dispatch an American observer to the specific area of interest for a 
temporary investigation. While this does occur, the majority of such "spiked" (tasked) 






Figure 4.   Spiked/Tasked Coverage of Indigenous Co-Operatives. 
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This thesis in no way disparages the good offices of trusted indigenous co-
operatives, nor the daily contribution they make to enhancing American information 
gathering. However, as outlined in chapter two, there are limitations and difficulties with 
using indigenous co-operatives (and the currently limited number of American embassy 
personnel) for such tasks. By contrast, and as part of an overall DOS engagement policy, 
the GEP envisions dividing the entire globe (and its constituent sovereign states) into 
GEP Areas of Operation/Responsibility (AOs) as an augmentation to existing DOS 
efforts. To the extent that such envisioned GEOs are available and the host nation allows 
expanded DOS representation in their country, GEOs would be posted to AOs on a 
virtually permanent basis. An abstract division of a notional host country into sub-
national AOs is shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.   GEP Plan for Sub-National AOs. 
 
Such sub-national AOs would not follow a rigid template, but would be 
determined by competent authority (in a "Global Engagement Agency') to align with 
significant ethnic, religious, cultural, and other demographic fault lines/groupings. As 
shown in Figure 6, traditional American mission reporting would continue normally 
following the assignment of the AOs. 
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Figure 6.   GEP plan for Sub-National AOs with Current/Typical Areas of Routine Coverage 
Superimposed. 
 
GEOs (augmented by Special Forces Teams when and where appropriate and in 
the context of the REC concept) would be posted into the AOs on a permanent/near-
permanent basis (See Figure 7. The green icons represent GEOs and/or SF Teams as 
appropriate). 
 
Figure 7.   GEP Operative Assignments and/or SF Team Assignments in Country of Interest. 
The permanent/near-permanent presence of such GEOs/SF elements would 
dramatically expand observation and reporting coverage in the country of interest (See 
Figure 8) -- GEOs on a permanent basis as an augmentation to traditional and ongoing 
DOS efforts, and SF as appropriate and in the context of the REC. GEOs would routinely 
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report to a GEA representative on the Ambassador's staff at the embassy, and SF Teams 
would report to and through their specified, mission chain-of-command. Maximum 
benefit from such expanded observation and reporting by SF Teams functioning in such a 
"global scout" role would be obtained by close coordination and information sharing with 
the embassy. The promise of such maximum, enhanced information value should indicate 
to both the DOS and USSOCOM the imperative for interagency coordination and 





Figure 8.   GEP Expanded AO Coverage of Units Themselves and Reporting Chains. 
 
As the continuous presence of GEOs and/or SF Teams matured, direct American 
observation and the observation of multiplied sub-national networks of indigenous co-
operatives would diffuse throughout the entire country; expanding American information 





Figure 9.   GEP Expanded and Comprehensive AO Coverage and Reporting Chains. 
 
From the view of senior policy/decision makers in America, the typical current 
(and traditional) process of gathering information upon which to make strategic decisions 
is represented in Figure 10. American officials track and develop information on "Known 
Knowns (KK) and" Known Unknowns (KU),"while worrying about what the "Unknown 
Unknowns (UU)" might be. This thesis argues that the basis of UU is overwhelmingly 
based on American ignorance of foreign human environments which are "Virtually 
Neglected (VN)"; i.e., those same human micro-environments outside of traditional, 
routine DOS observation and reporting. Although specific, targeted operations can be 
(and routinely are) targeted to fill- in information gaps, such "top-down" operations are 
characterized either by a "dead reckoning" approach to information gathering (i.e., 
starting from a "known" point), or blunder into virtually neglected areas (often ending in 
mission failure or worse). By the persistent and continuous presence of GEO and/or SF 
Team augmentation to traditional observation and reporting -- or as persistent and 
continuous as American and host nation limitations and restrictions will allow -- UU and 












Discrete Ops to Fill 
Known Info Gaps
 
Figure 10.   Typical Information Gathering Process for Strategic Decision-Making. 
 
Moreover, while the traditional role for state-to-state relations is to encourage and 
support American policies in the host foreign regime (bilateral policy agreements, 
reforms to liberal democracy, etc.) from the top down, such efforts will continue to be 
limited by lack of information on sub-state conditions outside of host nation regime 
structures. Such systems often leave the ground truth on host countries conditions 
unreported/under-reported. While traditional American representation to the foreign 
nation should and would continue, the presence of GEOs (augmenting the DOS) and 
military SF Teams (when and where appropriate) would provide unprecedented coverage 

















Figure 11.   Routine Process for Strategic Decision-Making with GEP Operatives In-Place. 
 
2. Summary of the GEP 
With GEP operatives in-place the U.S. Government (USG) is provided: (1) 
observations and reporting on areas previously uncovered (immersed in areas that 
previously were Virtually Neglected and detecting the Unknown Unknowns); (2) a 
source of verification of the effectiveness and impact of American government 
engagement initiatives (both intended and unforeseen) ; (3) a source of verification of 
foreign state agencies’/operations’ presence, effectiveness, impact (both intended and 
unforeseen), and compliance with bilateral agreements; (4) a gauge of the foreign state’s 
sincerity in meeting USG expectations; (5) data input that will help to refine USG 
knowledge of AO, leading to the identification and understanding of foreign micro-
groups which, in turn, should lead to better policy for, and operations by, other 
instruments of American power.  
Military engagers -- such as SF soldiers in the context of a REC -- would be used 
in a military context, under military direction, and like the REC concept envisions, would 
be employed with as nearly continuous a presence as practicable. The flexibility of 
military SF soldiers however, would allow their movement where and as needed 
dependent on the current situation and national strategic priorities. By contrast, civilian 
operatives of the DOS GEA (GEOs) would be permanently fixed to their geographic  
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AOs. To the greatest extent achievable, DOS GEOs would remain dedicated to, and 
located in, fixed AOs for an entire career of augmentation to embassy observation and 
reporting. 
The priority mission of SF soldiers in REC would vary according to changing 
conditions and military mission requirements. Observation and reporting might 
sometimes be the priority military mission, but at most other times observation and 
reporting would be a corollary to other mission priorities. By contrast, the priority 
mission of civilian DOS GEOs would be continuous observation and reporting of ground 
truth made possible by continuous presence and unparalled expertise in their assigned 
AOs. To the extent that American and host nation limitations and restrictions allow GEOs 
to be located amongst the local host nation population, such presence provides an 





















IV. THESIS SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
America is currently the world’s strongest military and economic power. 
Nevertheless, there are real limits to the reach of American power and influence, based 
on – among other things - a lack of information on, and a lack of consistent engagement 
in, the wider world. The reality is that America continues to engage the world officially 
and primarily as a national state in a familiar system of states in an otherwise anarchic 
world system. Current American government structures and methods of engagement with 
the world  -- especially the mass majority of the world’s population -- are inadequate to 
American security requirements in the 21st century. America requires a new and 
deliberate method for such engagement -- a level of engagement unusual to the traditional 
means of DOS representation, and unprecedented in its diffusion throughout, and 
permanent focus on, mass human communities in foreign nations. The method proposed 
is a Global Engagement Plan (GEP) that does not currently exist.  
To meet the challenges of the twenty-first century – a century which promises 
continuing friction between the forces of modern globalization and traditional patterns of 
human order – America will need to make use of every available mode of engagement. It 
is therefore useful and necessary to periodically review the way in which America 
engages the world. This thesis argues that American security and national interests would 
be well-served by engaging the world in a deliberately diffused manner. A proposed 
Global Engagement Plan (GEP) would permanently place American civilian operatives in 
every micro-region of the world to observe and report information in human 
environments that are under-observed, and whose activities are under-reported. Such 
operatives would: (1) establish a permanent and continuous American presence at a 
foreign local level; (2) provide an additional means to observe and report ground truth of 
such foreign environments on an unprecedented scale; (3) provide open source human 
information on foreign populations and environments useful to verification of local 
conditions, foreign government behavior toward their population, and American 
Government agencies' and non-governmental organizations' (NGO) activities and 
effectiveness abroad; (4) present continuous and locally-derived foreign information 
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useful to the coordination of all the instruments of American national power during 
specific events and operations; (5) provide continuous information capture and reporting 
for the ongoing development of na tional databases and policy formation beyond specific 
events and operations; (6) serve, where appropriate, as liaisons between foreign local 
micro-environments and other manifestations of American engagement policy; (7) 
provide, when appropriate, in-place pilot teams and bases of operation for all other 
instruments of national power; and (8) provide, where appropriate, operative agents of 
American foreign policy in pursuing the stated American interests of spreading liberty, 
the rule of law, human rights, and free and fair trade.  
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Hypothesis Review 
Hypothesis: This thesis' hypothesis is that traditional methods of USG 
engagement with foreign populations, while necessary, are nevertheless insufficient to 
observe and report on the majority of the world's population in a persistent, consistent, 
and long-term manner. If threats to America are believed to increasingly arise from such 
(predominantly non-elite) masses, it would be prudent to develop an ability to conduct 
such observation and reporting. Army SF has the charter to act as global scouts among 
their array of missions. The military, however, is most often focused on more short-term 
instrumentality in its use of SF. To reap more persistent, consistent, and long-term 
observation and reporting, the military could use a REC that focuses on more consistent 
presence. Given that military efforts (understandably) follow military rationales for 
employment, and such efforts are sometimes limited by their very military nature, it 
seems reasonable to make GEOs civilian operatives. Civilian operatives -- as part of the 
DOS mission -- would be more acceptable to many more foreign host nations than would 
the presence of American military personnel. Nevertheless, simply increasing the number 
of traditiona l FSOs is not an adequate solution. Permanent/near-permanent presence in 
such environments requires operatives to have the TTS common to SF soldiers. It is 
therefore recommended that such civilian DOS officials -- GEOs -- be drawn from 
retired/transitioned SF personnel. 
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2. Answers to the Research Questions. 
1. Are the traditional instruments of American power sufficient for persistent, 
consistent, and long-term engagement with foreign human micro environments -- an 
engagement that results in continuous observation and reporting of mass human 
communities outside of the traditional corridors of power?  
Traditional instruments of American power as currently structured and employed 
are not sufficient for persistent, consistent, and long-term engagement with foreign 
human micro environments. Possible threats to American interests emanating from mass 
(primarily non-elite) human communities outside of the traditional corridors of host 
nation power too often remain under-observed and under-reported on using current 
American instruments and procedures. 
 
2. How can military observation and reporting be improved?  
One method of greatly enhancing the military's role in engagement, observation, 
and reporting of foreign human micro-environments can be found in a Regional 
Engagement Concept (REC). The REC outlines how USSOCOM could better use its 
assets -- with Army Special Forces (SF) in the vanguard -- to provide improved American 
military engagement. 
 
3. How might a civilian method of observation and reporting be conceived, and 
what new structure might be recommended to achieve this civilian method of observation 
and reporting?  
Military assets typically respond to changeable national and military priorities. 
Therefore, very often military presence and engagement is impermanent in any given 
Area of Operation/Responsibility (AO). Such impermanent presence is not conducive to 
maintaining persistent and continuous levels of observation and reporting on any given 
AO. Assuming USSOCOM does not significantly change its method of utilizing SF, a 
solution to impermanent presence is to create a Global Engagement Plan (GEP) that 
would post DOS officials in fixed, sub-state AOs -- wherever appropriate and achievable 
-- to augment traditional DOS observation and reporting. Because such duty could be 
expected to be relatively harsh, demanding, and even more dangerous than typical DOS 
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foreign service, specially-recruited and prepared DOS civilian officials should populate a 
Global Engagement Agency (GEA) subordinate to the DOS. Such civilian GEA 
operatives (GEOs) would likely require the same temperaments, traits, and skills as those 
common to SF soldiers. It would be appropriate to further explore the idea of recruiting 
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